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THE GREAT GALLUP COAL STRIKE OF'1933

HARRY R. RUBENSTEIN

I

N THE I930S labor underwellt a major transition, andexperienced the rise and decline of a nationwide radical union movement.
The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in
1933 ushered in a new age of labor relations. Under section 7a of
this act workers were granted the legal right to organize into union,s
of their own choice and bargain collectively with their employers.
Little research has been done on the history of labor in New
Mexico during these turbulent years., There is, however, ample
evidence to suggest that its residents felt the era's effects, as employees throughout the state attempted to form organizations for
their own mutual protection.
Thollgh workers" rights were now sanctioned under this law,
their struggle' to achieve them was far from over. Years of high
unemployment after World War I, followed by the depression,
had adversely affected unionization. With dwindling ,funds the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) drastically reduced, its, organizing efforts and fought a losing battle against wage reductions,
layoffs and declining membership. Internally, factionalism char.:.
acterized the labor movement; Major splits between radicals and
traditionalists led to the establishment of dual unions in numerous
industries. Declining and divided, the labor movement struggled
to take advantage of this much needed concession obtained from
the government, and threw its almost exhausted resources into
a major' drive for mernbership, aiding workers in exercising their
newly obtained rights.
Employers throughout the, country" including New Mexico,
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quickly reacted to the legislation either by fonning company
unions of their own or by simply disregarding the implications
of the law. Labor organizers found themselves still combating the
traditional forces used against them; company guards, state militias
and court action. Additionally, as a result of the NIRA, a new
dimension was added to workers' difficulties. Companies faced
with communist or radical unionists turned to more conservative
labor organizations, offering them limited recognition in order to
avoid the establishment of a more progressive union.
Between 1912 and 1933, union membership in New Mexico
decreased, whereupon the state experienced a new resurgence of
activity. AFL craft unions started to rebuild themselves and
achieved minor victories, most notably the organizing of the
retail clerks in Clovis. Agricultural workers in the northern part
of the state began to unite under the Liga Ohera de Hahla Espanol,
a semi-industrial union that originated in the beet fields of Colorado. In the metal mines the International Union of Mine, Mill
and Smelter Workers established five locals. It was, however, in
the coal mines throughout New Mexico that the greatest strike
activity centered.! The largest of these strikes took place in the
mining community of Gallup. In August 1933, miners struck the
city's five bituminous coal fields, the Gallup American Coal Company, Mutual Coal, Light and Power Company, Diamond Coal
Company, Gallup Southwestern Coal Company and Defiance
Coal Company, for union recognition.
.
Coal companies in the Gallup area, as was true with industry
in general, had suffered from the depression. Nationally, at the
beginning of 1933 producers saw no indications that this condition would improve. In the first three months the industry
reached new lows as the financial crisis of that year deepened.
Though the industry began to recover following the nationwide
bank holiday in March, mines west of the Mississippi continued
their decline. 2
Production at the Gallup mines followed this trend and the unemployed increased their ranks. 3 By August 1933, half of the area's
two thousand miners were out of work,4 while many of those who
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were lucky enough to keep their jobs were working a short week.
At the Gallup American Coal Company, the largest mine in the
region, miners worked an average of two or three days a week,
as the company tried to carry as many men as possible through
these hard years. 5
Since 1922, when miners lost a strike organized by the United
Mine Workers of America (UMWA), grievances had mounted,
and it was only a matter of time until another outbreak of militancy would occur. Complaints were many and varied from mine
to mine, though certain of these were commonly expressed. Miners
protested against racial discrimination suffered by native Chicanos
and aliens from Mexico and eastern Europe. They Wanted their
own grievance committees, overtime pay, increased pay fOf dead~
work (non-mining maintenance work), arid a reduction in penalties for loading dirty coal (coal mixed with rock). Accusations
that the companies had tampered with the mine scales were numerous.
Soon after the NIRA was sig~ed into law, Horace Moses,'manager of Gallup American's Gamerco mine, made plans to organize
a company union. On July 10, 1933, Moses called his employees
together to inform them of his intentions. He noted that in ,the
past managemerit had objected to labor organizations, but that
if miners now chose to form an independent union he would wel~
come it.' He set July 13 as the date for them to meet and elect
officers and grievance committee members.
What had initially been prompted by an act of legislation provided the groundwork fora much needed worker-controlled union.
Nearly all of the mine's 554 workers were present when a temporary'chairinan called the election meeting to order. Immediately
two men' from a nearby mine took the Roor. They convincingly
argued against a company union and suggested that a distriCt union
would 'provide additional advantages of independent strength and
unity. Others supported their argument, pointing out'that the
new recovery act granted them the right to form a union of their
own choosing. The majority accepted this alternative and 'adjourned the meeting. 6
'
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Shortly thereafter two "outside agitators," RobertF. Roberts and
his wife Martha, who had been active in the Pecos Valley farm
strike, carne to Gallup at the request of a group of workers to help
in their organizing drive. The Robertses were both graduates of
A. J. Muste's Brookwood Labor College, an institution established
to train progressive labor leaders, and were currently serving as
representatives for the National Miners' Union. 7
The National Miners' Union (NMU), evolved as a reaction
against the growing conservatism of the United Mine Workers
and out of policy changes in the Communist party. UMWA president John L. Lewis had by 1925 gained total controlof the union.
The power to elect organizers had been taken from the rank and
file and handed to Lewis. In that year progressives'and communist
members of the UMWA had formed the Save the Union committee and had been expelled by presidential fiat. One local after
another had been placed under presidential trusteeship, giving
Lewis control of the whole organization and subjecting it to a
one-man dictatorship. Internal conflicts and factionalism continued until opposition forces pulled out of the union. One of
these factions under communist leadership met in the fall of 1928
and formed the National Miners' Union, claiming a membership
of forty thousand. s In 1929 when the Communist party reversed
its position on working within established union structures and
setup the Trade Union Unity League as an alternative labor
federation, the NMU joined as one of its largest members. 9
The fundamental purpose of this new miners' union was to
establish a rank and file organization and to compete directly with
the UMWA for the loyalties of miners in unorganized coal fields:
It called for workers irrespective of race or sex to join, and to
"participate in the struggle for abolishing the capitalistic system
and replace it with socialism."lo
It was in areas such as Gallup that the NMU achieved its
greatest following. The union's strong emphasis on organizing
those subject to racial discrimination· and its stress on militant
action appealed to Gallup miners. When the local coal workers
again met to discuss building a district union,' they decided to
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change their original plans and join one of the two national organizations, either the UMWA or the NMU. In a vote of 451 to 27
the .National Miners won the support of the men .and began' to
take steps to obtain union recognition from the companies. l l
_-Their organizational drive soon met with opposition. The
Gallup city council refused the NMU a permit for a fund-raising
dance on the grounds that they were "un-American and Anarchistic" and linked with the Communist party.12 Though it is questionable whether they were un-American or anarchistic, links did
exist between the NMU and the party.1S Following the refusal
by the city council, the Robertses held a mass meeting, where they
denied charges of communist affiliation; reportedly a thousand
people attended. 14 Though openly calling for socialism and distri~
buting communist literature, NMU organizers, the Robertses and
others, continued to deny any relationship with the party throughout their stay in town. The red scare which followed World War I
had demonstrated to radicals the consequences of being too bold.
The NMU's primary purpose was not to debate the merits of
communism but to establish a union in Gallup, a vehicle through
which the workers could formally voice their grievances~
.' Close to twoweeks after this demonstration the National Miners
were prepared to present a list of demands to coal companies. On
August 26, "miners began circulating grievances to four of the
five mine managers; the Defiance Coal Company was excluded
at this time.' The demands consisted of several points, most importantly, the right to joiri a union, recognition of an independent
miners' committee and checkweighman, a redefinition of dirty
coal with a reduction in penalties, required deadwork to be paid
at company rate, overtime pay, and all powder to be charged to
the men at cost price. The union offered mine owners time to consider the various items on the list, but this was not needed. 15 Only
H. E Mills, manager of the Mutual mine, postponed his decision
and said he was willing to discuss the situation after the NIRA
industrial codes for the bituminous coal industry were drawrt up;
these codes would regulqte both business and working conditionsJ 6
The other managers promptly gave-refusals on all points.
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On the same day that the, lists were circulated, forty miners at
Diamond Coal Company's Allison mine withdrew from the NMU
and applied for a charter with the United Mine Workers. Company officials encouraged this switch to the more conservative union
and urged their employees to join the UMWA, 17 The NMU
membership suspected that the Mine Workers were planning to
sabotage their organizing efforts by splitting the miners as they
had done in other parts of the country, and realized that a fight
between two rival unions was inevitable. Deadlocks in negotiations
over the NlRA coal codes, negative responses from employers
and UMWA presence in the area prompted the NMU miners
to call a strike. Workers formed locals at each of the mines. They
made plans to establish a relief fund and organized women and
children into separate union auxiliaries, involving the entire family
in the upcoming struggle.
On August 29, 1933, picket lines formed at the five major
coal mines in the Gallup vicinity. The union concentrated its
members at the Gallup American where more than two hundred
strikers demonstrated in front of the entrance. At the Defiance
mine, the only company not presented with a list of demands,
a local committee appeared early in the morning, gave the manager
the list, and when he refused to negotiate, set up picket signs. The
first day of the strike demonstrated the union's solidarity. They
succeeded in peacefully shutting down all the mines, and the
NMU's leadership proudly claimed a membership of 970 out of
approximately one thousand employees. 1s
Confident after their initial successes, the miners soon learned
that their struggle had just begun. Though the strike had only
been· in effect for one day and there had been no acts of violence,
Governor Arthur Seligman, a self-proclaimed friend of labor, on
the basis of reports he had received acted quickly. He declared
martiallaw for McKinley County and ordered National Guardsmen to entrain. 19
The local sheriff had been one of the first to telegraph the governor. He reported the situation as being beyond his control, insisting that without immediate assistance bloodshed and damage
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to. property would result. 20 Seligman authorized the sheriff to
deputize additional men, but he responded that the only solution
was to send in troops. Other individuals and groups who voiced
the need for martial law .were Gallup's mayor, prominent citizens,
mine owners and officials in the United Mine Workers, the Big
Four railroad brotherhoods, and the American Federation of Labor.
"I did everything possible- to avoid sending the troops," he wrote
to Senator Bronson Cutting's secretary, "but the appeals were so
insistent and so many prominent people from other parts of the
state, who I contacted, both Republicans and Democrats, believed
it best for me to act and act promptly. "21 .
Seligman ;ordered National Guardsmen from Albuquerque,
Clovis and Roswell toleave immediately, and placed approximately
250 troops under the command of General Osborne Wood. Wood
was once a miner himself and had been involved in labor disputes.
His past experience, Seligman believed, would soften the manner
in which martiallaw would be enforced. 22
U pan the guard's arrival at 12: 3° that night, they dispersed
nearly one hundred picketers in front of the Gallup American entrance. This was an unusually high number of strikers to be active
so late at night, but their presence had to do with problems encountered earlier in the evening: The miners, who were picketing
in. eight-hour shifts, had been due for relief but deputies had
barred their replacements. In response NMU members had later
assembled and, led by Martha Roberts and eighty singing women,
six hundred men marched "in defiance of armed guards" to relieve
the tired picketers.
While the miners' show of solidarity was able to intimidate
the sheriff's-deputies, it achieved little when matched against the
National Guard. The next, morning guardsmen dispersed five
hundred miners and· proceeded to union headquarters to enforce
a mass gathering ordinance, which required a permit for aU gatherings over five persons. 23 Since permits were handed out sparingly,
NMU meetings were held across the Arizona border under the
close scrutiny of the guard. At union headquarters members met
in groups of five, passing notes between rooms, and pickets were
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scattered down the roads leading to the mines with no more than
three or four men congregating together. 24
Though theNMU was able to maintain some semblance of
unity, the troops had weakened their position. Guardsmen had
been instructed to protect both mine' property and picketers as
long as they remained peaceful. The troops also saw fit to protect
strikebreakers, and willingly escorted them into the mines. 25 The
coalfields began to reopen as a result, and the first coal was pulled
out the day after the guard arrived. Gallup's unemployed and
nearby Indian reservations provided a large supply of laborers.
Under the guard's protection their manpower slowly replaced the
workers who had left their jobs. The Gamerco opened with eighty
men, forty-three of whom were underground workers. On the
following day the Diamond Coal Company operated with six
diggers and twenty-three company men. Normally 125 diggers
were employed. The other mines announced that they too would
open soon. 26
Letters of protest poured in from across the country to the governor's office, accusing him of deliberately breaking the strike. 27
The NMU urged him to retract his decision:
Despite your denial, it is very evident that the militia is being used
as a strike breaking institution and is giving direct and Material aid,
to the employers against the mine workers. The presence of the militia
has only resulted in the creation of tension and the choking of the
union from normally functioning. 28

The United Mine Workers did not remain idle through these
developments. John L. Lewis telegraphed the governor offering
assistance, suggesting that an alternative policy would be for mine
owners to make an agreement with the UMWA and "encourage
a union which is committed to the upholding of American institutions."29 Lewis sent Frank Hefferly into Gallup to see if he could
help. Hefferly had worked the mines in Gallup and was blacklisted
from them when he participated in a strike in the early 1900s. He
was also a strong Lewis man. 30 Following a directive from the national office, Hefferly ordered all UMWA miners back to work
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and offered membership to strikebreakers if they chose to join.31
As the tide turned against the walkout, additional supporters
arrived in Gallup. Pat Toohey, national executive board member
and founder of the NMU, took over active direction of the strike;
Accompanying him were Dick and Spike Allende~, brothers organizing for the union in the west, and George Kaplan, International Labor Defense representative. Soon to arrive from Hillsboro,
New Mexico, was American Civil Liberties Union attorney Edward D. Tittman. Both Tittman and Toohey soon after their
arrival praised the National Guard for showing "rare discretion
and judgment."32 However, these were the last compliments extended by either party.
The "unbiased" officers in the guard were less complimentary.
Second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Sage, had
this to say about the organizers:
.
The leading pair [the Robertses], claiming to be man and wife, are
experts in their line. They ought tobe. They admit that they have
spent years at their chosen profession. But they are not coal miners,
have never been and have no intention of ever working in a mine
of any kind. Two brothers [the Allenders] are aiso here. Neither has
ever worked in a mine of any kind. One claims to be a hod carrier,
the other admits he is a pool hall bum when not on strike duty; ...
And then there is one who claims to be a lawyer, and another, a
negro [James Walker, local miner], whose only claim to fame is that
several years ago his father was wounded during a strike riot. Because
of this fact he is supposed to know all about strikes and to be able to
predict their outcome.
Quite a motley crew, gathered together for the common and avowed
purpose of bilking an ignorant group of people out of all the cents,
and sense, they may posess [sic].
But, as different as these people are externally, they. are .exactly
alike internally-WITHOUT EXCEPTION ADMITTING THAT
THEY ARE· ACTIVE AND MILITANT COMMUNISTS"RED" COMMUNISTS-anti-government, anti-constituted .authority, anti-everything" And they tell you frankly that you can take it
or leave i t ! 3 3 ·
.
.
.
.

Activity accelerated following the .arrival of the newcomers.
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The miners conducted a house-to-house canvass asking strikebreakers to stay home and achieved minor successes. Picketing
again increased, and as a result, fewer men showed up to work 34
It was at this time of renewed confidence that Charles W. Grubbs,
regional officer for the NIRA, attempted to negotiate a settlement
over the dispute. He came at Seligman's request. 35 Grubb's first
impressions were optimistic, but negotiations between the NMU
and the operators proved more difficult than he had anticipated
since company officials stood firm in their refusal to discuss demands. Grubbs urged the miners to return to work and to let the
National Labor Relations Board arbitrate, but the strikers refused,
fearful that if they returned nothing would be done for them
and strike leaders would be fired. 36 He noted that the conflict
would continue as long as the troops remained since the mines
were able to secure enough help to meet their immediate needs. 37
Other government officials also recommended that the men call
off the walkout and wait for the NIRA industrial codes. Seligman,
at a September 4 meeting with strike leaders, had approved most
of the workers' major demands but prevailed upon them to wait
before taking further action. 3s Benito RodrIguez, from the Mexican Consulate, was sent to investigate the conditions of Mexican
nationals, approximately four hundred of whom were involved
in the strike. From these men he heard charges of discrimination
in assigning jobs and work areas, but RodrIguez was only able to
suggest that they go back to work. 39
On September 12 the Gallup American Coal Company entered
into an arrangement with the United Mine Workers. At the
Gamerco mine, where 175 strikebreakers had joined that union,
manager Horace Moses agreed to recognize their grievance committee and checkweighman. The men asked neither for union
recognition nor did they present a list of demands concerning
working conditions. A few days later Diamond Coal followed
Moses's lead and settled upon a similar agreement. 40 In strike
bulletins the NMU strongly attacked these agreements, damning
the United Mine Workers as labor fakers, union busters, and
company agents used to divide the miners' ranks. 41
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The strikers' position had been eroding slowly over the first
two weeks when on September 15 five strike leaders were arrested
by the sheriff on charges of vagrancy. Those arrested were the
Robertses, Harry Mavrogenis, Alejandro Alvarado and E. H. Navarro, three local NMU leaders. This harassment prompted a
demonstration of nearly one hundred school children who left
school and stormed down the street chanting, "We want Martha
[Roberts]." A group of women also marched to city hall demanding the release of the leaders. Both demonstrations were quickly
dispersed by the National Guard. 42
The arrests occurred at the same time an agreement between
the NMU and the Mutual mine had been reached. The NMU
local accepted a compromise position and agreed to return to work.
But the miners would not go back to work while fellow members
were in jail. Mine officials reacted to this as a breach of the agreement, and issued a statement that they would begin to hire new
men to fill the vacancies. 43 The Southwestern mine remained the
only one that had not decided to hire replacements.
The strike leaders were released from jail on September 18,
the same day that the long-awaited NIRA codes for the bituminous coal industry were completed. Many of the demands made
by the NMU were embodied in these codes, which. promised to
, ease later negotiations. 44 Upon their release the five NMU leaders
once again prepared to strengthen the strike. On September 22,
the largest group of miners and their families were out picketing
since the strike began. At the Gamerco mine over four hundred
strikers were in front of the entrance gate. It was here that the
first real flareup of violence occurred. William Reese, local miner
and UMWA organizer, with three others ina car on its way to
the mine, sprayed a "dark fluid" from a hand extinguisher in the
faces of the picketers, Guardsmen held the crowd back, letting
the car get away. Six persons were taken to the hospital, and
twenty-six others were treated for minor injuries.' Charges against
Reese were dropped because, according to General Wood, a rock
had first been thrown through the windshield of the car. 45 Only
Reese was called in to give his version of the incident, and the
>
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NMUwanted to know why he wasn't arrested for inciting a riot,46
They never received the answer to their question.
The NMU's first victory took place on September 23. A settlement was made with the Southwestern mine. The terms were a
compromise; though B. B. Hanger, the operator, refused to recognize the union, he did accept the workers'grievance committee
and checkweighman, and the reinstatement of all strikers. 41 Miners
had debated the value of settling with one mine at a time since the
walkout began, but as the general conditions of the strike worsened,
this idea won greater support. They felt that if they could get at
least a foothold in the mines their position would be strengthened. 48
The agreement was made on the same day that Governor Seligman died of a heart attack in Albuquerque. 49 This did not alter
the status of the National Guard; his successor, Andrew W. Hockenhull, maintained martial law in the area.
The second month of the strike showed an increase in tensions;
the mines that were operating with strikebreakers had approximately 50 percent of their needed work force. Mine owners were
intimidating aliens with threats of deportation if they did not
return to their jobs, and outbreaks of violence occurred on a regular basis. The NMU complained to Hockenhull of the guard's
abuse toward strikers and their families. They accused the troops
of insulting their wives, bullying their children and denying
permits for benefit functions. 50
But harassment continued; on October 5, seven strike leaders
were arrested on charges of inciting others to violate martial law
and to arm themselves. Those arrested were Robert Roberts, George
Kaplan, attorney Clarence Lynch, a member of the International
Labor Defense who had recently arrived, and four local NMU
leaders. The men were placed on a bread and water diet for refusing to do the yard work expected of military prisoners. 51 The
state's attorney general suggested to Hockenhull that he pardon
the men in order to ease the tensions in Gallup, but no action
was taken by him at this time. 52 The defendants were tried separately by a military court. Roberts and Kaplan were both found
guilty on the contradictory testimony of two guardsmen and were
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given the maximum sentence of six months at hard labor. The
others were released. 53
Even though the two men were in jail, miners entered into
negotiations with Diamond's Allison mine. By October 23, an
agreement similar to that made at the Southwestern mine was
settled upon,. and they began to return to work. Two mine
companies had now made lasting agreements with the NMU.54
Troop reductions were ordered as a result of the Allison agreement as well as political pressure from around the state. The National Guard had created a heavy burden on the state's budget.
Hockenhull sought financial assistance from the federal government,55 but though aid never came, the troops were not recalled.
Mine owners threatened to close down their operations if he
cancelled martial law; this would have had serious economic consequences. The Santa Fe railroad had for a time been contemplating replacing their coal-fueled engines with oil burners. If· the
Gallup supply ceased, there was little doubt the railroad would
make the change, thus affecting the state's entire coal· industry.
Also, the Gallup American was two-thirds owned by Nevada Consolidated, which operated the Chino copper mine near Silver City
and a smelter at Hurley, New Mexico. The company announced
that it would close all properties if the guard were removed. 56
Although it was doubtful that such threats would have been
carried out, Hockenhull decided not to take any chances and instead attempted to arbitrate the strike. He sent William A. Keleher
and ex-governor Merritt C. Mechem to investigate. conditions in
Gallup. The two arrived at the beginning of November and held
hearings with the three groups involved, the NMU, the UMWA
and the mine operators. The testimonies were nothing more than:
a recapitulation of unsolved differences of opinion, which had existed for many years. NMU representatives reiterated their longstanding grievances with the companies, accused public officials
of abusing their offices and pointed to section 7a of the NIRA to
justify their position: The committee representing the UMWA
was made up of individuals holding superior positions in the mines.
They defended their right to be currently working and favored
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maintaining troops in the area. In talking with mine operators it
was learned that only fifty or so openings were left for the 350
miners still on strike. Union recognition still was strongly opposed
by all of them.
The operators shared the opinion that the UMWA was the
better of the two organizations. Defiance manager George Miksch
told the two investigators:
The United Mine Workers are a better class of people than the National Miners Union. The National Miners Union consists of I
would say probably 80% Mexicans, probably 80% of those are not
citizens of the United States. Therefore the United Mine Workers
is a more intelligent race of people, but as far as recognizing the
United Mine Workers I can't say what the other miners would do
about that, but I never recognize any union myself. 57

Though their reasons might not have been based on such racist
attitudes, the other company representatives did hold a higher
opinion for the UMWA. It was apparent that the operators would
accept local committees and loose organizations, but not a strong
union. Their proposed solution for resolving the conflict was to
keep troops in Gallup and to place agitators in jail. There was,
however, a minor concession made by these men. If and when
the strike ended, they said they would rehire more workers than
they needed to ease the situation.
The governor's hopes of obtaining a quick settlement through
these hearings were soon blocked by a series of additional arrests,
which created new obstacles. On November 4, Martha Roberts
led .a demonstration of three hundred strikers and their families
to the county jail in protest of the imprisonment of the two strike
leaders. A fight between the National Guard and the protesters
broke out, resulting in injuries on both sides. 58 Martha Roberts
and eleven others were placed in jail, only four of whom were
later released. One week later five more strike leaders were arrested
and held on charges of violating martiallaw. 59
Hockenhull repeatedly had requested aid from the National
Labor Relations Board, which finally sent John Moore to arbitrate
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the situation. When Moore arrived the strike was approaching its
third month and miners. were weary and in the mood to compromise. Mine owners were also willing to bargain; with winter approaching, the mines were anticipating increased sales in heating
coal, and sought an end to the conflict. Within a week Moore had
finished his investigation and began negotiations.
By November 22, an eight point agreement had been reached
with all parties concerned. The NlRA codes covered many of the
original demands. The other points agreed upon included immediate employment of one hundred strikers, with the remaining
individuals to be placed on a preference hiring list, a promise of
no discriminatory action against those who walked out,. an elected
grievance committee and checkweighman, and the testing of all
mine scales. For those miners left without work, Hockenhull was
making arrangements to give them preference in federal and state
work projects. 60
The only remaining obstacle was the jailed leaders. Moore was
in favor of their release, but felt it was up to the governor to make
that decision. Hockenhull agreed on the condition that they sign
a promise to leave the state for one year. All but six signed, and
the status of the strike remained uncertain. The miners were willing to accept the terms negotiated by Moore, but would not return
to workunless the remaining six were freed. 61 Finally all were released, after giving verbal promises that they would leave. On
November 27 the strike ended.
At requests from the operators and town officials, who still feared
outbursts of violence, the National Guard was not removed en
masse. By December 18, all troops had been gradually sent home
with the exception of three enlisted men and two officers. 62 Martial
law remained in effect through January.
The end of the strike brought a brief period of peace to Gallup.
However, as a result of the compromise settlement, many of the
same grievances made at the outset of the walkout were still being
heard two months after the miners returned to work. Company
stores still· overcharged employees, and workers were paid in company scrip in violation of the NlRA codes. Housing conditions
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in the mining camps revealed negligence on the part of the owners.
Wage deductions ran so high that workers remained in constant
debt to some companies. There were continued charges of discrimination. Where NMU and UMWA membership coexisted,
both grievance committees were recognized making grievance procedures ineffective. Also, Governor Hockenhull's promise of employment to miners was never fulfilled to the degree it was intended
or needed. 63
Tensions remained high in the Gallup area over the next year.
In the early spring of 1935 the Gamerco mine sold a tract of land
on which employees lived, and a new outbreak of militancy developed, this time resulting in the deaths of the sheriff and two
miners. Gallup was once again in the headlines as national attention was drawn to the murder case of the ten accused. The NMU
disappeared from the labor movement when the Communist party
once again reversed its policy and disbanded its dual unions. Its
members joined the UMWA and established it as the dominant
union in the Gallup mines. Once unified the miners were able to
gain the union recognition that had eluded them in 1933.
Prompted by new legal sanctions, workers in Gallup rose up
to claim their right to form a union of their own choosing. Though
the NMU clearly represented a great majority of the miners they
soon discovered the NIRA's unenforceable nature, and encountered the combined forces of the companies and the state. Rather
than create an atmosphere for unions to cooperate in, the act intensified factionalism as unions competed and undermined each
other's organizing drives to gain the elusive recognition promised
by law.
As in most strikes in American history, accusations of radical
subversion and foreign influence were used to justify official state
action and rally public opinion against the union. The facts that
the NMU was a Communist party affiliate and that there were so
many aliens involved reinforced this argument. Workers chose a
union that they felt would most actively work for their benefit,
not necessarily for its politics. As seen in the list of demands, the
miners asked for only moderate changes which they felt were
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justified. However, the NMU's political ideology had its effect.
In years following the strike communist affiliated organizations
such as unemployed councils and an International Labor Defense
chapter remained relatively influential in the community.
A revitalized labor movement emerged in the 1930S, touching
off strike activity throughout the country. Workers participated
in over 10,000 strikes from May 1933 to July 1938 involving
more than 5,600,000 membersoftheir ranks. 64 In the coal mines
alone over 17°,000 men struck in 1933.65 Rather than being
unique the Gallup strike was highly representative of this period.
The involvement of radicals, management's disregard of workers'
legal rights, competition between unions, local governmental repression and federal mediation, all which characterized the era,
were also prevalent in Gallup.
.
The events in the eastern mining districts of the United States
overshadowed Gallup in magnitude and militancy. The San Francisco general strike and the Flint sit-down strike were more signifi~
cant in their attempts to bring new tactics and radical alternatives
into labor's campaign for justice. However, the Gallup strike indicates that New Mexico was incorporated into this struggle, and
rather than being an isolated section of the country was part of
the turmoil of the 1930S.
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DEPORTATION: THE IMMIGRATION SERVICE AND THE
CHICANO LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE 19305

D. H. DINWOODIE

THE oppressive impact of the deportation practices of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) on labor activism
during World War I, the 1920S, and 1950S is well documented.!
Less known is the role of the INS in the New Deal period of the
1930S, a time of labor resurgence in general and ChiCano worker
mobilization in particular.· INS officials were on hand in the many
labor conflicts of the 1930S featuring Chicano activism; Immigration inspectors· investigated participants in coal mine conflicts in
New Mexico during the 193os,in the great California strikes of
1933 and '34, in the Arizona demonstrations in the same period,
in the south Texas organizing efforts in 1936, iIi the California
farm worker strikes in the same year, in the cotton strikes of 1938
and 1939 and in many other labor disputes throughout the southwest. On virtually every occasion that mobilizing Chicano workers
encountered local forces of law and order, the ubiquitous "migra"
appeared.
Most immigrant leaders of the Chicanos experienced an INS
investigation at some point and many repeatedly. Subversion
charges again Jesus Pallares, a leading Chicano organizer in New
Mexico, removed him permanently from the American labor scene
in 1936. A fellow organizer for the Liga Obrera de Habla Espanal
in New Mexico, Julio Herrera, had been deported the preVious
year on charges of illegal entry in 1908.2 A deportation order
against Colorado beet workers' leader Paul J. Arias, based on his
arrest as a strike leader in 1932, was suspended by the INS. But
during the height of the 1938 UCAPAWA3 organizing campaign,
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Arias's final hearing for admission to citizenship was delayed by
an examiner resurrecting the earlier charge that he had advocated
the forceful overthrow of the United States government. 4 A leader
in the Imperial Valley strikes of 1934, who by 1940 was the president of a UCAPAWA local in Brawley, was arrested for deportation during an organizational drive on charges of illegal entry
while returning from a visit to Mexicali. 5 Jess Govea, a well-known
UCAPAWA organizer, was given "voluntary departure" in lieu
of deportation during a strike in the Yuma, Arizona, lettuce fields
in 1938. Labor disturbances in £1 Paso, Texas, in 1939 and 1940,
resulted in an anti-Communist crusade, carried on by the local
sheriff and the Dies committee, in which the Immigration Service
investigated several of the activists and carried out deportation
proceedings against one leader. 6 A principal organizer of smelter
workers in that area, Humberto Silex, eventually faced deportation
charges, but vigorous legal support by his union successfully countered the government case. 7
The citations can continue at such length that broad questions
insistently arise on the effect of the "liberal" New Deal milieu on
the INS and the impact of other forces on that agency. On the
first matter, it is clear that a measure of the social concern characteristic of the upper levels of New Deal administration percolated down to a law enforcement agency such as the INS. Both
Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins and the· new Commissioner
of Immigration and Naturalization, Daniel W. MacCormack,
were determined to modify some of the most arbitrary policies of
the agency. Indeed, after 1933, the number of deportations and
so~called voluntary departures dropped to nearly one-half of the
previous rate of 30,000 annually. The reduction in deportations
and voluntary departures to Mexico paralleled the overall figures
changing from a rate of about eight thousand in each category
to about four to five thousand each throughout the I 930S. 8 It
should be noted, of course, that these 10,000 or so annual deportation actions were concentrated in the few states with sizable Mexican immigrant populations; Moreover, expulsions under federal
immigration statutes represented only a small proportion of de-
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partures to Mexico, most of which were "repatriations" organized
or encouraged by local authorities.
. Partof this change in the deportation rate was attributable to
causes external to the administration of the agency. The general
depression drop in immigration from Mexico no doubt played a
role in the reduced numbers of illegal entrants apprehended by
immigration inspectors. Moreover, the virtual disappearance by
1933 of an anti-Chinese campaign in Mexico reduced pressure
on the border from those escaping that outbreak of nativism. But
a third reason for the changed statistics derived from a modified
policy by the Perkins-MacCormack administration regarding the
use of warrants by arresting officers of the Service. 9 Shortly after
MacCormack-himself an immigrant-took office in 1933, district
directors of the INS were instructed by the commissioner to terminate the previously common practice of securing a warrant for
arrest only after an alien had been picked up on suspicion and interrogated. In line with this policy, they were directed to cease
practicing mass roundups of presumed illegal aliens. An attorney
commented with surprise about this time to American Civil liberties Union Director Roger Baldwin that his "... most recent
deportation case was a case of lawful arrest-for almost the first,
time in my experience they obtained a lawfully· issued warrant
.
before taking the alien into custody."lo
LiberaHzation of the warrant policy was limited, however; by
compensatory actions of the Immigration Service. To reduce the
presumed high rate of flight of those for whom a warrant was ·requested by .mail from Washington, officers were authorized to
continue. the practice of telegraphing headquarters with a cursory
presentation of evidence if they feared that an escape was imminent. l l In addition, aliens "emoute to a final destination," a category·in which many migrant laborers could be placed, were still
subject to arrest without warrant. A final limitation on liberalization involved the necessity of assuring Washington officials authoriiing warrants. that there was sufficient cause to believe
immigration statutes had been violated. To provide convincing
evidence, heavy reliance continued to be. placed on the word of
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informers. 12 This use of ex parte statements was a convenience
for the INS since it lessened the need for an investigation which
might call the attention of suspects to the presence of Immigration
inspectors. With this dependence on surreptitious information,
the Service encouraged the submission of random allegations and
rewarded regular informers fipancially. This interest in citizen
spying was not restricted ideologically-in fact, on request of a
Chicano labor leader the INS carefully investigated the head of
a particularly oppressive company union in the San Antonio
pecan shelling industry.13 Thebulk of complaints, however,came
from the xenophobes and labor baiters.
Despite field officers' conviction that use of informers was an
essential basis for investigatory work,14 the practice promoted dissemination of unsubstantiated accusations and a consequent atmosphere of fear in Chicano communities over threats of deportation.
In the words of Ernesto Galarza this fear reached "the proportions
of a community psychosis, affecting even those who have legal
status as resident aliens."15
A second line of liberalization taken by the INS officials, supplementing the new warrant policy, modified immigration legislation which provided discretionary authority in some deportation
cases. The bulk of these cases fell under statutes requiring deportation of three classes of aliens; illegal entrants, those advocating
forcible overthrow of the government, or aliens who had been
sentenced to imprisonment for a yearor more on a conviction for
a crime involving moral turpitude which was committed within
five years of entry, or who had been sentenced more than once
for such a crime committed at any time after entry. Commissioner
MacCormack supported legislation granting him the discretion
of cancelling deportation in cases involving the first two classes,
providing that the aliens could show lengthy residence in the
United States, good moral character, and prospective hardship
for family members remaining in the country. In case of alleged
radicals, further proof would be necessary that the alien had not
engaged in subversive conduct or agitation. Partly as a lever to increase public support for administrative discretion in hardship

DINWOODIE: DEPORTATION

197

cases, MacConnack on the other hand advocated broadening deportation authority for classes of criminal aliens. This was to be
achieved by extending beyond five years the period in which a
crime involving moral turpitude would result in deportation. 16
The commissioner had issued orders by 1937 staying deportation,
pending congressional action, in some four thousand alien hard. ship cases.
The legislation embodying discretionary authority was considered regularly by Congress through the 1930s, but was only
enacted in the 1940 Alien Registration Act, in which a limited
liberalization was applied to the illegal entrant's class. Congressional action on the administration propositions foundered during
the 1930S in the currents of conflicting constituent pressures.
Liberal elements, legal defense organizations, and social welfare
agencies supported the recommendations on the grounds of humanitarianism and economic self-interest. The National Catholic
Welfare Conference, an agency which sponsored a church-affiliated relief program in areas along the border with Mexico, pointed
out that family separation in 1936 resulting from deportations
would result in over six hundred additional welfare cases in the.
£1 Paso, Texas, area alone. 17 Arguments which carried the day with
legislators, however, rested on nativism. Unions, public officials,
and exclusionists proposed stronger alien control measures intended to return to their country of origin the "Mexican peons"
with whom the relief rolls were presumably clogged. IS Other current imagery augmented the economic antipathy toward foreigners. The general labor unrest of the time, the arrest of Bruno
Hauptmann in. the Lindbergh kidnapping case, and the anti-alien
policy of much of the nation's press (particularly the Chicago
Tribune; the Hearst chain, and Saturday Evening Post), aroused
intolerance influencing congressmen and jeopardizing any liberalizing efforts of the Immigration Service administrators. 19
With leadership in the New Deal Department of Labor frustrated by the politically impossible task of administering "with
some liberality the most reactionary immigration laws in the
world,"20 the second and dominant set 'of influences on the execu-
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tion of immigration policy came, as with many other New Deal
programs, at subordinate and local levels. And here Immigration
Service officers were influenced less by national policy than by
bureaucratic practices, organizational needs, and local conditions
and attitudes. 21 An INS inspector-in-charge reflected the force of
the racial imagery common to the southwest when he dealt with
a complaint over INS practices at the Nogales, Arizona, port of .
entry. He discredited the protest by slurring the origin of the
signatories: "The majority of such names are those of mestizo or
half-breed Mexican Americans. One or two are half-breed Mexi~
can negroes."22 Conversely, the zealous pursuit of immigration
law violators was sometimes stimulated by close observation of the
conscienceless exploitation of undocumented laborers by growers
who often were able to maintain conditions of peonage by preying
on the aliens' fear of disclosure. Raids on a Texas cotton operation,
resulting in one hundred deportations, were justified in part on
the basis of the ranchers' labor practices which were thus disrupted;
low wages, illegal liquor sales, substandard living quarters, overcharging in the company commissary, and underweighing on rigged cotton scales. Termination of the supply of illegal aliens
permitting such an operation, INS officers explained, would free
the ranchers to "fOlm an association to procure and distribute
labor in a business-like way."23
Though integration of a transient INS bureaucracy with the
dominant local structure could not be complete, inspectors' actions
and attitudes could reflect their close relationship with other elements concerned with the "foreign" issue in the border area. INS
officials participating in the surveillance of Chicano labor organization in Laredo, Texas, were simultaneously members of the American Legion Post promoting the group's disruption. The expression
of one of them, an official of the Legion's Department of Americanism, that "there is no such thing as a hyphenated citizen"24
would have been inseparable from the convictions he brought to
his INS duty station. Immigration officers often coordinated their
activities closely with community officials carrying on similar
anti-radical campaigns. Close rapport existed between the Gov-
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ernor of New Mexico and the inspector carrying out an investigation of Communist activities in 1935; the sheriff's department,
INS, and the Dies committee investigator worked together closely
in the El Paso case in 1 940; during a simultaneous investigation
in California, Immigration Service officials relied for evidence of
Communist activities on the files of patriot groups, including the
Better America Association of Los Angeles. 25
The point has been made recently that immigration law enforcement is primarily pro-active or initiatory in nature, as opposed
to most police work which is characterized by reaction to the complainant's social system. 26 It is true that the dramatic surveillance
and shoot-out activities of the Border Patrol in the Prohibition
era fitted that proposition. Much immigration law enforcement
during Depression era social and economic stress, however, reacted
. to widespread allegations of alien economic competition and requests for investigation. Professor Abraham Hoffman has made
this case in a recent article in Journal of the West dealing with
complaints from Superior, Arizona. 27 Among many other examples
was the INS cooperation in the Colorado border blockades. Aware
of the relief politics lying behind Governor Johnson's interdiction
of migrant Chicanos in the spring of 1935 and 1936, as well as
the illegality of those actions, the Service nevertheless detail~d
inspectors to participate in the operation. The officers were instructed merely to avoid personally either interference with legal
interstate travel or arrests unsupported by warrants. Even after
the militia blockage of the southern Colorado border in April 1936
produced only two deportable aliens, a request for INS assistance
for Colorado highway patrol scrutiny of "suspicious aliens'.' was
approved. 28
The routine assignments of immigrant inspectors and border
patrolmen to question those arrested in labor disputes has been
noted. INS officials insisted that their policy was "to remain strictly
aloof from participation or connection with labor difficulties. ~ ."
and to avoid any implication in the· strikebreaking activities of
local law enforcement agencies. 29 Yet, the psychological impact of
this close r~pport between INS officers and law enforcement coun-
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terparts often served to bulwark the local anti-labor, anti-immigrant
forces. This was not always the intent of INS officials-they could
act occasionally. to protect Chicano farm workers from forms of
extortion based on their fear of deportation. 30 But the repressive
effect certainly followed from the typical organizational tendency
displayed by the INS, that of self-maintenance. The agency was
susceptible to pressure groups or influential individuals demanding
action whose ultimate recourse lay with Congress, the fundgranting body.31 As with all government departments, correspondence that was flagged as politically significant received immediate
and sympathetic attention. The assiduous response to the contacts
of officials across the Southwest served further to justify the
agency's funding and level of staffing.
Certain practices of the INS were induced by the bureaucratic
urge for efficiency. The reliance on informers seems to have been
one such example. Another was the common intrusion of the
Service's activities into relief and other welfare programs. Practices
of public welfare boards varied among states and counties, but
immigrant inspectors were frequently granted access to the personal records of relief clients in the southwestern states. The efficiency of both agencies were thought to be served in this way:
the INS obtained data on citizenship and residency compiled by
others; the relief organization received Immigration Service assistance in eliminating illegal entrants from its rolls and in determining citizenship in programs where this was a requirement.
Protests by some professional social workers or liberal welfare
board members pointing out the incongruity between these practices and the purposes of the relief body occasionally frustrated
INS requests for access to relief files. 32 Immigration officials recognized· that use of this method would locate few deportable aliens.
Yet "every possible effort" was made to locate illegals through
relief agency records. 33
Such extensive intrusion of immigration law enforcement into
the Chicanos' social and economic life was difficult to counter.
While influential persons faced with a challenge to their immigration status could slow down administrative procedure, gain a
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precise indication of required supportive data, and obtain political
backing, most Mexican aliens lacked the necessary social standing
or legal knowledge. In any case, the transitory life of those who
were migrant workers, or the marginal social existence in the
permanent Chicano colonies, often precluded institutional record
keeping of marriages, births, and residency. Where facts were
available or the law subject to diverse interpretation, money for
adequate legal defense was usually lacking. An attorney in Dallas,
Texas, in informing the Immigration Service that the parents of
an alien under deportation order could no longer aid his defense,
movingly expressed the "hope that in future cases similar to this,
financial means may be available for the interposition of necessary
legal opposition, to the end that justice may be served."34 The
appeal in this case on a disputable point of law was thus terminated.
Resistance to immigration' 'law investigation or enforcement,
then, often took a passive form, as in the case of labor conflicts
or other large-scale investigations where fearful residents or migrants would leave an area while the inspectors were present. In
instances where Chicano functionaries were 'designated as contact
points between a local government agency and' the INS; the information they were expected to supply to the immigrant inspectors
might not be ·forthcoming. 35 More forceful protest depended on
the support of organizations. U CAPAW A promised protection
from the Immigration Service as an inducement in organizing
drives. In one instance a U CAPAW A local in California circu~
lated a list of INS informants and some of the individuals whose
name graced the document received rough treatment at the hands
of the union membership. 36
In the early 1930S Communist unions arranged legal assistance
from the International Labor Defense (lLD) for their members
and other labor figures. A handful of ILD attorneys in the southwest undertook. the difficult, and often disappointing' task.of
defending activist clients in cases ranging from riot trials to deportation hearings. Unfortunately, the demonstration and mass
letter-writing techniques practiced by the ILD, and other organi-
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z3:tions primarily relying on public appeals, such as the American
Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born, could work to the
detriment of the defendant by antagonizing enforcement officials
and judges:
Committed though it was to defending individual rights, the
American Civil Liberties Union was cautious of immigration cases
in view of the peculiar limitations on the defense in these administrative law cases; burden of proof of legal status was placed on
the claimant; rules of evidence were much less rigorous than in
criminal law; Immigration Service hearing officers were in a position to evaluate their own investigative work in the case; and
language differences between Mexican aliens and ACLU attorneys
hampered defense preparation. Nevertheless, the ACLU took
pains to protest illegal arrests or violation of due process in deportation cases.
The entrance of Mexican consuls was likely to come late in
deportation proceedings when INS officers were required to procure a certificate of nationality from the consulate of the prospective deportee's country of origin. Some consuls conscientiously
undertook investigations to verify the nationality of the presumed
Mexican national rather than accept the American government's
evidence of citizenship. In these cases the consuls could be bypassed by the INS officials, who would make their request for
certification of another consul on the route toward the border. 37
A Mexican Army officer who served as consul in £1 Paso, Texas,
in the late I930S provided material for numerous Immigration
Service complaints by his determination to interview each of the
deportees from his district prior to issuing a certificate of nationality. He was thus in a position to evaluate the validity of the
deportation case against his conationals.38 Despite interposition
of their authority, the consuls were able in most cases to achieve
little more than delay. The most useful service they could perform
for the prospective deportee was to secure permission for his voluntary departure, in lieu of deportation. Under this provision, those
who had corne athwart the immigration statutes were able to
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leave in the company of their families and possessions, and they
might eventually apply for readmission.
Ameliorative measures also were all that could be achieved
by individual advocates of Mexican aliens facing Immigration
SerVice proceedings. Catholic laymen, particularly Thomas Mahony in Colorado and Cleofas Calleros, the National Catholic
Welfare Conference representative in El Paso, could serve as
intermediaries with the INS, request stays of deportaticm, and
provide assistance for relatives of deportees remaining in the
United States. 39 But their legal and financial resources were
limited; and their religious concerns precluded any action on
behalf of aliens whose radical activities could be interpreted as
stemming from the doctrines of "godless" Communism.
Essentially, then, the Mexican alien could count on little protection from the New Deal's legal liberalism; neither could his
few friends in the Anglo social structure help much in countering
the prerogatives of the INS and the local and bureaucratic forces
to which the agency responded. Considering that the most reason~
able course of action was unobtrusiveness, the number of alien
Chicanos among theranks of activists in the labor ferment of the
19 joS is impressive indeed.
0

0

0
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THE BRITISH PRESS AND THE MEXICAN WAR:
JUSTIN SMITH REVISED

WILLIAM H. MULLINS

I

1846 England was one of the great powers of the world; the
United States, although not on a scale with some of the European
countries, held the dominant position in the Western Hemisphere;
and Mexico, twenty-five yea~s after winning independence from
Spain, was still trying to establish itself as a stable 'nation. Except
for. a direct' attack on Great Britain, the actions of neither the
United States nor Mexico were really a threat to England. The
English government considered itself a friend of both countries,
although the,continued growth of the United States was a matter
of some concern. Indeed, it was in 1846 that the two countries
had settled the dispute over the Oregon Territory which could
have led to a serious conflict.
When the war between the United States and Mexico broke
out in May of that year, the British government officially assumed
a friendly, neutral stance; yet, at the same time, it cast a begrudging eye upon the obvious opportunity the United States had for
what many English believed to be aggrandizement. The English
government, then, ignored the conHictin America as much as possible; however, the ,var did seem to stir a certain amount of interest
among the infonned public of England.
.The first person to comment on this public reaction was Justin
Smith: In i914 Smith, who wrote the first complete history of
the war between Mexico and the United States, read a paper to
the Massachusetts Historical SoCiety entitled "Great Britain and
Our War of 1846~I848." In this paper, which was a preview of
a chapter in his book, he analyzed the attitudes of the English
N
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public toward the war, basing his conclusions upon his research
ip British newspapers and his· own broad knowledge of the conflitt. As one reads Smith's comments sixty years later, it appears
that, especially in regard to the British, he Was all too much a
captive of.his times. The purpose of this study, then, is to take a
fresh look at the subject, reevaluate the evidence Smith used, and
then come to some conclusions about the merits and shortcomings
of the earlier work.
First it is necessary to set the stage by briefly examining the
official and unofficial policies the British government pursued
during the conflict between the United States and Mexico. On
May 13, 1846, the United States declared war on Mexico. Secretary of State James Buchanan immediately sent a dispatch to
Louis McLane, the American minister in .England, telling him
of the war. Buchanan instructed McLane to inform Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen that hostilities had commenced, that the objective of the United States was to conquer a lasting peace, and that
Mexico would be blockaded to hasten such a peace. 1
The two men who occupied the British Foreign Office during
the two years of war were very different individuals, who followed
quite different poliCies. Lord Aberdeen held the position for less
than two months after Zachary Taylor crossed the Rio Grande.
He was regarded by Americaris and English alike as a pursuer of
peace who was agreeable to compromises and approaches which
would lead to such a goal. Lord Palmerston, the man who con~
trolled British foreign affairs for the majority of thetwoyears,had
a reputation for aggressiveness and taking a hard line. Certainly
George Bancroft, who replaced McLane as minister to England in
the latterpartof 1846, neither liked nor trusted him. 2
McLane and Bancroft were concerned not only about the attitudes of the official policy makers, but also about English public
opinion. Immediately after news of the war became public, British
opinion seemed to be, at least to McLane's mirid,overwhelmingly
against the United States. According to McLane, many were concerned about the increased power that an American victory would
bring to the United States; A belief which gained some currency
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in Britain was that the preparations being made, ostensibly for the
conflict with Mexico, were in reality for a war with; Great Britain.
In lightof this the American minister pleaded with his government
fora swift conclusion to the war. 3 Aberdeen; however,persuaded
McLane that the government was not going to assume a militant
stand, and showed the worried minister an earlier note to Mexico
warning that England would remain neutral if hostilities broke
out~

Astime went on and Bancroft replaced McLane, the American
minister's reports on British policy grew more sanguine. Although
he still detected indications of English bluster from time to time,
Bancroft reported that the British would even permit the annexationof Mexico~a sentiment, echoed by Palmerston himself.4 In
a typical statement, Bancroft,who never could be accused of underestimating the greatriessof the United States,wIote to Buchanan:
~ : . through· the clouds of angry words and feelings, public· andprivate, the conviction is constantly becoming deeper and deeper, that
it is.in vain for European Powers to attempt to arrest or check the
prosperity of our country.5.

Indeed, by the end of the war, both the English leaders and the
publiC werecongnitulatirig the United States on its successes,and
Bancroft still believed an annexation of Mexico would be sanc~
tioned;6
In Parliament, debate in the House of Commons turned to the
war on only two occasions, both times early in the course of the
conflict. In late June 1846 Prime Minister RobertPeel explained
the government's position; but in August.Lord George Bentinck
and Benjamin Disraeli made speeches which must have made
Americans uneasy. Lord George reminded the House that private
interests in Great Britain had important investments in Mexico
which wer~ being imperiled by the war. Moreover, he continued,
the United States was set upon a war ofaggressive conquest, which
could possibly lead to an attempt to seize British possessions in the
T
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join with several other countries to govern Mexico as a protectorate
and to create a strong, free, nation. s Two other members who joined
the debate counseled greater moderation and a course of non..
interference in a matter they considered of no critical importance.
From general public and semiofficial reaction to the war, it
seemed possible that the government of Great Britain might
strongly and formally encourage America to make an early peace.
The actual policy was simple but firm. Aberdeen, when McLane
informed him of the outbreak of hostilities, immediately made an
unofficial offer of mediation to the American minister. This was
eventually conveyed to Washington where it was ignored by the
United States. Palmerston made a second, official offer of mediationtoboth countries shortly thereafter and this was rejected by
both belligerents. Also, a precautionary defensive step of making
a shipment of arms to Canada was taken. The government of
Great Britain, then, was able to ignore the whole matter officially
while standing ready as a mutual friend to work out a suitable
peace.
Several problems arose out of, or were affected by, the war.
Because the Oregon dispute, which was a definite threat to friendly
Anglo-American relations, had not been fully settled by the time
the war began, it was a matter of immediate and considerable
concern. McLane, in fact, accused Aberdeen of urging the Mexi~
cans to war in order to pressure America into accepting an Oregon
settlement favorable to the British. Although the Foreign Secretary
denied this, it is likely that the approach of war, combined with
his conciliatory attitude on the Oregon question, did lead to an
early settlement. 9 Disraeli, however, was unsatisfied and warned
that with the acquisition of Oregon and Texas the United States
was taking steps toward surrounding and ultimately seizing a great
deal of Mexico?O
. California was another territory which might have led to trouble
between the United States and Great Britain during the war.
When the Hudson's Bay Company, long before the war, advised
its' government to take possession of the area as a colony, the suggestion was turned down. An unofficial offer by the Mexican agent
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in London to sell. California to Great Britain, after the territory
had been lost, met the same fate. Bancroft correctly analyzed the
position of the English when he wrote informally to President
Polk;that Great Britain did not have any love for the United
States, but the British government was reluctantly forced by its
respect for America to remain neutral in regard to California. l1
Palmerstonalso skillfully handled two issues which grew out of
the war itself. Rumors that an agent of Mexico was issuing letters
of marque in England elicited a question in Parliament about the
legality of such actions. Palmerston assured the questioner that
upon request of the Queen the Foreign Enlistment Act would be
invoked against anyone soliciting for privateers. 12 Although the
report about the Mexican agent was false, Palmerston's response
was undoubtedly reassuring to the United States. Another incident
relating to the war was also handled. to the satisfaction of the
American government. In August 1847 the mail steamer T eviot,
which·as a mail ship was allowed togo through the U.S. blockade
to Mexico, brought to Vera Cruz General Mariano Paredes, the
former Mexican President. The United States government claimed
that because a ship captain should be:responsible for his passengers, Captain May of the T eviot was grossly negligent in permitting Paredes to return to Mexico. The United States protested,
asking that some action be taken again the captain. Palmerston
turned the matter over to the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company
which suspended May.
Although 'England held itself aloof from the war and acquiesced
in the tremendous territorial expansion which resulted from the
American victory, it is probable that an alteration in the AngloAmerican power relationship was an outcome of the war. By permitting the·United States to absorb the Oregon, California, and
New Mexico territories the British were giving up any hope of
establishing or supporting a power in the Western Hemisphere
strong enough to be a balance to the United States. 13 England, of
course, still held a strong position anywhere in the world ,through
its sea power, and Palmerston consoled· himself· in the accurate
belief that the United States was headed toward division partly
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due to its eXpansion. Fortunately for the United States England
did not aid or encourage Mexico; nor did the British take ad·
vantage of America, especially on the Oregon question, during
the war. Indeed, both Aberdeen and Palmerston seemed almost resigned to continued territorial eXpansion of the United States.
With this background, we can now turn to the reaction of the
British public to the war, and then proceed to critique Justin
Srnith's evaluation of these sentiments. Although newspapers
could not be considered a totally accurate gauge of public opinion,
it is stilI valuable to analyze and compare the position of several
contemporary publications in order to understand what attitude
many of the informed public had toward the war on the other
side of the Atlantic. It is possible, moreover, to gain a greater
insight into Smith'spresentation by examining newspapers, since
he used them as virtually his only source.
Even though response to the war between the two American
neighbors bordered on disinterest at the official level, this was
hardly indicative of the reaction of several leading newspapers
and periodicals of the time. All of the publications included in
this study presented not only a great deal of news from the battlefields, but also considerable advice and comment on the justification, prosecution, and results of the war.
Possibly the most important newspaper in the world in the
mid-nineteenth century was the Times of London. With correspondents in every part of the world, the Times's peerless international coverage was thorough. The amount of news about the war
between the United States and Mexico and the quantity of commenton the war far surpassed that of any other paper in England;
The Times was considered to be ct • •• on the side of the more liberal
conservatives" before the 1848 revolutions. 14 The editor of the
paper, in part for personal reasons, was a supporter of Aberdeen in
almost everything he did. Because the London paper objected
to the Corn Laws, however, it was not friendly to any other part
of Robert Peel's government. On the other hand, the Times
frequently quarreled with the succeeding government of Lord
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John Russell, especially attacking Palmerston. The anti-American
and rather antidemocratic views of this newspaper almost always
overrode any other consideration when it editorialized on the war.
To provide a balance, several other sources of editorial commenthave been examined. The Manchester Guardian, aimed at
the cotton manufacturers at Lancashire and influenced by:the
commercial contact between Liverpool and the New World, was
one of the important newspapers published outside London: The
Guardian advocated the franchise for the middle class (but not
lower classes) and a laissez faire economy.15
The -Examiner, a London Sunday paper, and The lllustrated
LondonNews were two publications which presented both hard
news and an abundant number of feature articles, and thus fall
between the classificatIon of newspaper and periodical magazine.
Both were reform-minded, calling for better treatment of the poor,
factory legislation, and reforms in the parliament, the army, and
prisons. 16 A conservative, loyalist Canadian newspaper, (Canada,
of course, was still.acolony at the time), the Montreal Gazette,
adds to the balance of opinion, by providing an unmistakably
English point of view fromthe New World. Two periodical essays
from the Westminster Review and Tait's Edinburgh Review round
out the sources examined. As we shall see, the opinion of the
English newspapers an,d periodicals in regard to the war possessed
a: great degree of unanimity, despite their diverse attitude on domestic matters.
All of the daily or weekly publications had basiCally the same
format for presenting War news and views. As ships arrived from
America, the United States newspapers were searched for significant news. The papers would then print this in a column entitled
"United States" or ''The War between the United States and
Mexico," which would usually be headed with a short paragraph
informing the reader upon what ship the information had arrived
and whether the .news was interesting or not (it ~was usually
deemed uninteresting). The news was, presented in the form of
long excerpts from American papers, important messages and
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speeches, or a well pieced together summary of several newspaper
reports. Editorial comment and the hard news were very rarely
mixedtogether.
The Times, with its correspondents, was able to add to this
second hand information. A regular reporter was in Mexico writing
and commenting about conditions in that country. In the United
States the Times had two contributors. The regular correspondent
reported infrequently; but an American citizen, who signed his
regular reportorial letters to the paper "A Genevese Traveller,"
contributed his usually Anglophilic impressions of his country.
At the beginning of the war, a great deal of news about the conRict filled the pages of the papers; but as it progressed slowly with
long lulls, the news became at times rather sparse. Then, with
the outbreak of the rash of revolutions in Europe in 1848, news
of the end of the farther removed war all but disappeared. Even
the Montreal Gazette failed to report the final ratification of the
treaty between the United States and Mexico.
For the most part, each paper restricted its judgments and comments to the editorial columns. Only the Times, whose .correspondents regularly mixed fact and opinion, permitted comment on
the news to escape its editorial page. Also, a few readers contributed
letters stating their views on the war on the North American continent. Although the factual reporting is important in the sense
that its quantity might be indicative of the concern each publication showed for the war (e.g., the tapering off of news at the
onset of the 1848 revolutions); it is the editorial opinion which
is critical for this study. It is this comment which at times must
have. helped shape, and at other times reRected, the opinions of
the readers of the newspaper. It is possible, then, to begin to get
at what public opinion there was in Great Britain concerning the
war between Mexico and the United States by examining newspaper editorials.
Before the outbreak of the war, the settlement of the Oregon
dispute was the subject which filled the "United States" columns
and which was granted editorial space in English newspapers. The
Guardian and the Examiner advised Aberdeen not to weaken to
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the war party of Polk, which was trying to make political capital
out.of the issue. They recommended such a course even if it meant
plunging Great Britain into a war with the United States.17 In
April reports of a possible conflict between Mexico and the United
States began to appear. As these predictions grew into reports of
actual fighting, the Oregon issue was still the foremost concern
in England; The Times called for a speedy finalization of the
Oregon- question while the war, which then seemed to be destined
fora swift completion, occupied America's attention. There was
a concern that after the war the United States would undoubtedly
be. more bellicose than ever, this time toward Great Britain. 1S
Understandably, then, English newspapers viewed the conflict
in its. early stages mainly in terms of its effect on the Oregon
question.
In all wars it seems to be the duty of those who report it, if they
are to do a complete job, to evaluate the causes of the conflict imd
sometimes place the guilt for the. war. .The English newspapers
were by no means derelict in this duty. Almost unanimously the
publications condemned the United States as the aggressor. All
five papers responded to President Polk's war message. These
journals rejected Polk's contention that the Mexican government
was at fault because it refused to negotiate with Minister John
Slidell and because Mexican troops attacked an American patrol.
Instead, the British press accused the United States of intention~
ally precipitating. the war by sending Zachary Taylor across· the
Nueces River into the disputed boundary of Texas. The Examiner, the Gazette, and the Times all soon correctly discerned that
a major American objective was California. The latter paper
pointed to instructions issued in 1845 to the American Pacific
Commander to occupy Pacific ports in case of war. 19 Needless to
say, this reconfirmed the belief that Polk and the "war party" were
acting from purely acquisitive motives. Nowhere in the papers
could a reader discover any hint that Mexico might in some way
be blamed for the war. The only attitude which was anything less
than accusation of the United States was the belief that because
America was so strong and Mexico so weak a war was inevitable.
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In accord with this idea a reviewer for the Westminster Review
maintained that the -United States could bring some order out of
chaos by conquering its weaker neighbor. 20
Even though the newspapers seemed to be primarily interested
in battlefield strategy and in the internal affairs of the two countries, they all were aware of the effects of the War on England.
The offers of mediation, which Aberdeen and Palmerston presented, were, of course, praised, but the Guardian and Examiner
correctly predicted thatboth countries, certainly the United States,
would reject the offers. 21 While the Montreal Gazette, early in
the war, believed that neither England nor France would permit
the United Statesto invade Mexico; the other newspapers took a
less concerned outlook, but assured their readers that Great Britain
would react if threatened and, indeed, had increased the size of
its fleet in the West Indies. 22
Probably the greatest immediate impact of the war on Great
Britain was economic, and the papers were well aware of the commercial effect. Although Lord George Bentinck's concern for private investors in Mexico was not reflected in the newspapers, trade
was a special point of consideration. The Times claimed that the
blockade of Mexico was having an especially adverse effect on
the port of Liverpool. A letter writer reported that no one would
unload Mexican ships, fearing a "war risk."23 Mexican bond
holders were also obviously upset at the war.
Mexican privateering, which was a potential threat to American
shipping, was a genuine concern for British commercial interests.
In fact, shipping insurance rates rose for a short period at the beginning of the war in response to a fear for the safety of American
vessels. The unsettling report that a Mexican agent was issuing
letters of marque stemmed entirely from articles in the Times. On
January 8, 1847, the Times announced that for the first time in
forty years authorization for privateering was being offered in
England. Five days later an editorial in the same paper condemned
this "barbaric custom." In the same issue a letter also poured out
_vituperation on the practice of privateering. This minor controversy
subsided quickly when on January 15 Frederic Bernes, a gunshop
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owner, explained in a letter to the Times that he had merely advertised that a genuine Mexican letter of marque wason display
but none were being issued. 24
A more substantial subject of. concern to the Times was the
forced loans which the Mexican government was attempting to
extract from British citizens living in Mexico. The Times protested 'notagainst the call for loans, but against the fact that a disproportionately large amount was sought from British residents.
~ccordingly, the London newspaper readily backed Lord Palmerston in his protest to the Mexican government. 25 Jt must have been
gratifying, then, to Bancroft or any other American observer of
English opinion, to see especially the Times take these positions
which, if not exactly pro-American, were at least not at all sympathetic to Mexico.
A special bright spot that appeared among the castigations which
the Times usually directed toward ApIerica during the war was
the newspaper's overall attitude toward the prospect of the United
States controlling Mexico, and how such' a takeover would affect
British interests. Even though the Times railed against what it
termed American aggression, the paper, echoing the opinion first
put forth in the: Westminster Review, advised England not to
waste time defending the Mexicin government, since domination
by the United States would create a much more settled, orderly
country. The frequent revolutions would come to an end, property
would be better protected, agricultural production would increase,
and the level of civilization would rise. As a result of this, the
Times editorialized, Great Britain's commercial interests would
be greatly enhanced. It was wise, therefore, topennit a conquest
by the United States. 26
In regard to other phases of the war, however, the Times and
other papers displayed a considerably less favorable attitude toward
the United States. All the newspapers held' the American army
in particularly low esteem. The Guardian believed few would
volunteer for the army, 'considering the health hazards' and poorly
organized supplysystem. 27 The fact that the army was composed
primarily of volunteers was' a' source of constant criticism from
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all the papers.. An ill-trained volunteer army, made up ofa hodgepodge of nationalities, could never hope to be effective, they
claimed. From time to time reports of drunkenness, brutality, and
misconduct appeared in papers. 28 The Times seemed especially
concerned that Americans would plunder the gold and silver
riches of the Mexican churches. 29 The commanders of the American army and their strategy were also targets of a good deal of
comment. The Examiner described Zachary Taylor as unimagina~
tive and reluctant to place his successful record in jeopardy by
making an attack on Mexican forces. The Times questioned Winfield Scott's strategy of stopping and starting on his way to Mexico
City.sO This newspaper also remained unimpressed by the crucial
American victories at Buena Vista and Vera Cruz. Explaining that,
even though beaten at Buena Vista, the Mexicans could still relax
on the wide plateau which· composed most of Mexico, and horrified by the bombarding of the city of Vera Cruz, the Times
could see little good in the American successes. S ! The Guardian,
however, said the two victories proved conclusively that American
forces were superior. As the war ground to an end the Times
finally concurred. s2
The Mexican army, however, fared even worse in the pages of
English newspapers. The American triumphs were analyzed in
terms of Mexico's weaknesses. To the Times both armies displayed
the poverty of character of the New World. An underlying theme
in many articles of other papers was the natural supremacy of an
Anglo-Saxon race over descendants of .the Spanish. This was
especially true of a writer in the Westminster Review who·believed the Mexicans were simply less civilized and unsurprisingly
cowardly.33 In light of all this, the newspapers took it upon themselves to offer the underdogs some advice. Especially the Guardian,
but most. of the other papers, implored the Mexican General
Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna to turn to guerrilla warfare as
an effective means of combating the Americans' overwhelming
strength. The Manchester publication and others pointed out that
it would be next to impossible to defeat a scattered, mobile army
in the vast unhealthful land of Mexico. 34 It is clear that in the
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estimation of English newspapers both armies were far inferior to
those of Europe, especially the British military forces.
Along with analyzing ,and advising the two armies, English
publications gave considerable attention, to the governments of
the opposing nations. Although most of the comments were directed toward 'the United States, the rather fluid situation at
Mexico City was given some space. As noted before, the unstable
Mexican government was an object of disgust. The British press
reported Mexican rulers to be at best ineffective and at worst
despots. They reviled a congress racked with intrigue and wrote
with growing consternation about each revolution. 35 The newspapers offered advice to the government, telling the Mexicans that
their fight against the United States was hopeless and that they
should begin to treat for peace immediately. The Times was especially offended at the prospect of such a weak government refusing to give in and begin negotiations to conclude the war.36
,The Mexican government, as a weak system almost incapable
of functioning at all, may have been beneath contempt; but the
United States could not fall to quite so Iowa leveL Indeed; a great
part of the editorial space the newspapers gave to the war between
Mexico and the United States was devoted to heaping c0ntempt
upon the American government. The Guardian and the Times
explicitly spoke out against democracy as a definite evil and a
vulgar form of government which led to war and internal chaos. 37
The newspapers believed President James K. Polk led a war
party which was seeking a conflict with another nation to gain
'popularity. The papers warned that this party not only had pushed
the United States into war with Mexico, but also had a strong
streak of Anglophobia which- potentially could create a conflict
with Great Britain. 3s .
A~ leader of' this party, Polk especially was held in disrepute
by the British press. He was called the "Napoleon of the backwoods," and piclured as ". . . the unscrupulous ruler of a democratic state confidently appealing to the passions of the populace."39
The reaction' to' the .President's major speeches was especially
scornful. Bancroft noted that the papers sent up a "growl" in
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response to the war message. 40 Later they claimed Polk blundered
into war with neither plan nor policy, and, as the war dragged on,
he was reaping his reward. 41 Although the Examiner actually
praised one of Polk's speeches as being temperate, his subsequent
messages were greeted primarily with derision. Despising as futile
his attempts at explaining the war, the Times said, "He has laid
it on so thick as to form an expugnable edifice"; and The Illustrated
London News termed the speech "bombastic."42 As the 1848
presidential election neared, the Examiner and especially the
Times took great pleasure in predicting Polk's political demise.
Taking an I~told-you-so attitude, the papers proclaimed that
waging war was an unsuccessful method of gaining votes. 43
British newspapers recorded the strong antiwar sentiment in
the United States with obvious satisfaction. Again and again each
paper announced which groups had become war weary. The
Times's Genevese Traveller described the country as gloomy as
the war continued much longer than expected; as early as November 1846 the Montreal Gazette announced that Americans
were tiring of war; an antiwar feeling was reported to be growing
in Congress; and in early 1849 the Times believed the administration itself hated the continuing war. When the United States
smuggled Santa Anna into Mexico, it was taken as a sign that the
American government was eager for a new Mexican government
with which it could negotiate a peace treaty.44
The primary vexation which plagued the American government
was the cost of the war. Very early in the conflict every one of the
newspapers correctly predicted it would be extremely expensive,
and on financial grounds alone the United States administration
would regret its decision to go to war. Of course, as the war continued, the publications noted the debates in Congress over further
spending. In an age which believed deficit spending was a wrong
which placed an unfair burden on posterity, the English journals
were interested to see how America would finance the war, and
commented ominously when Congress continued to appropriate
funds. 45 By the end of the war the Times and Guardian fully
expected America to plunder Mexico to recoup at least part of
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the expenditure. 46 Thus, English public opinion, at least as reRected in several newspapers, held neither the Mexican nor the
American government in high regard. The government of Mexico
was scorned for its instability and weakness; while the United
States was condemned by many for its democracy, its aggression,
and almost surely because it was a nation which waS becoming
steadily more powerful and which some day would probably be
a viable rival of Great Britain.
It was clear that the United States was by far the stronger of
the two belligerents, and that it was merely a matter of time before
the stronger would prevail. The capture of Mexico City by Scott's
forces in September 1847 signaled the military end of the war.
MexiCo, however, by its very weakness was able to thwart the
compretion of an American victory and prolonged the war several
months. There was no government which possessed sufficient
strength to negotiate with the Americans. Any group that dared
to sign a peace treaty would be' overthrown immediately by its
rivals. From the newspapers of Great Britain came more ridicule
than sympathy for America's dilemma. Not only did this further
substantiate their appraisal of the Mexican government, but it also
was treated as something which would teach the United States
another lesson. The Times, which declared the United States
to be winners yet still losers, compared fully defeating Mexico with
trying to crash into a comet which has no substantial nucleus. 47
Finally, the newspapers began to speculate on the possibilities
of peace. In April 1847 Polk had sent Nicholas Trist; a high
ranking clerk in the State Depar'tment, to· handle negotiations
with the Mexican government. It was not until the autumn of
that year, after the occupation of Mexico City, that any British
paper was prepared to believe a treaty could be concluded. The
Genevese Traveller, after months of declaring that there was no
peace in sight, finally infonned the Times in October 1847 that
the war might come to an end soon. 48 Most papers perceived that
the United States did not carefor all of Mexico; but wanted only
the disputed Texas land, California, New Mexico, and perhaps
the southern isthinus fOr a canal. The Guardian believed the
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Americans would not care to deal with the problems entailed by
absorbing more than that, while the Examiner advised Polk to be
satisfied with the area from San Francisco Bay north. 49 In March
1848, with the entire world preoccupied with the revolutions of
that year, the United States and Mexico ratified a peace treaty.
To all of this castigation and criticism which the British press
heaped upon the United States, Justin Smith reacted perhaps
typically for someone writing in the early twentieth century. The
first several paragraphs of Smith's paper provide the reader with
strong clues to his attitudes. He first reviews brieRy the sore points
in Anglo-American relations, beginning with the Revolution and
concluding with the disagreement over Texas before the United
Stites annexed it. It is clear that Smith was a fairly strong Anglophobe. As such, Smith was too easily and too greatly offended by
the anti-Americanism displayed by the British newspapers and
was unable to put their comments on the war into proper perspective.
Smith, moreover, held Mexico in very low esteem. In The War
with Mexico, his major work on the war, Smith characterizes Mexicans as a race inferior to Anglo-Saxons (a viewpoint which may
have been confirmed in his mind by the confused conditions in
Mexico at the time of his writing). He also goes to great lengths
to place the entire burden of guilt for the war upon Mexico. Such
an attitude seems to inRuence his earlier article.
. First of all, he puts too much responsibility on England and
the newspapers for encouraging the war. In his desire to place the
blame on the Mexicans, Smith paints them as "born gamblers"
who cOilld be led into war by the faintest hopes of victory. It is
Smith's opinion that the prospect of war between England and the
United States over Oregon proffered such a hope. 50 Certainly a
conRict between these two would have· been encouraging to
Mexico.· As Smith expands this po'int in The War with Mexico,
he claims that the Mexican government actually pinned their hopes
not merely on a war, but on an ~glo-Mexican alliance. 51 By May
1846, however, Aberdeen had informed the Mexican h~aders
that suchan alliance could never come about. The bravado of the
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most foolhardy gambler would have been subdued, rather than
fired, by England's official attitude. It is unlikely that England's
official pOlicy tipped the scale for war.
Smith also asserts that the deprecations of the American government in the English newspapers encouraged the Mexicans to
fight. As we haveseen,it is true that before the war many English
papers had doubts about American determination, ability, and
strength; and expressed beliefs that a fulL conquest of Mexico
could be a formidable undertaking. 52 It is unlikely, however, that
the influence that British journals had in Mexico could compare
with the more substantial causes of the war-the reluctance of a
weak Mexican government to treat with John Slidell; the unwillingness of Mexico to accede to a more powerful nation in what
it believed to be excessive demands; or the presence of Zachary
Taylor in the'disputed territory.
.
Smith summarizes his other findings in four points:
... it seems to be clear that our succeeding in a war with Mexico
was by rio means considered in England a matter of course, as we
have'been accustomed. to regard it; that our achievements produced
a state of mind respecting us very different from that which had prevailed before; and that our terms of peace,instead of appearing extortionate were viewed as disappointingly moderate. It appears evident
also that the British were disposed to welcome any safe opportunity
.
for interfering.53

His first point suffers from his own misapprehension of the inevitability of American victory. Throughout much of the war
various problems which the English press pointed ouf-the vastness
of the land of Mexico, its unhealthful climate, the problems of
American finance, and the lack of full domestic support in the
United States-were all .very real hindrances to victory and were
perceived by Americans. For many. in the United States our succeeding in a war with Mexico, or atleast our desire to succeed in
such .aventure, was not a matter of course. Smith's conclusion
thiltB'ritisli newspapers questioned America's fortitude is correct;
however,' they were being more' factual andiealistic than he is
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willing to admit. He seems to regard these analyses, which were
overstated at times, as unjust criticisms of America, primarily because they came from England.
Smith's second point about British attitudes toward America
contains some validity, but is also stretched. He relies on a quotation from Bancroft, who was as much an Anglophobe as was
Smith; to· prove that a considerable change of attitude toward
AmeriCa had occurred in· England after the war.54 It seems clear,
however, that the British government, including Palmerston, had
already conceded prior to the war that the United States was the
unquestioned power of the Western Hemisphere, and this was
one reason why Great Britain was unwilling to interfere~ A more
rigorous or fairer examination of newspapers, however, would
have revealed that for years after the war the Times was still neither
friendly towards nor respectful of the democratic United States,
and that in other newspapers only the estimation of the quality
of an American volunteer army was significantly altered by the
war.
British "disappointment" that the United States did not annex
all of Mexico, which is Smith's third point, was not as widespread
as he would have us believe.55 Surely, the Times could see an
ultimate commercial :tdvantage in the United States acquiring
Mexico; but perhaps even this was a rationalization for the British
government's policy of nonintervention. It is true that other newspapers seemed resigned to annexation; however, as pointed out
before, a majority of the papers analyzed in this study advised
against taking the whole of Mexico. Although many in England
were aware of the possibility that the United States could absorb
all of Mexico, they were hardly disappointed when this did not
come about.
.
Finally, Smith sees any effort by Great Britain to intenvene in
the war in any way as unnecessary meddling. He incorrectly states
the British believed a war against the United States would "impoverish Mexico, make her less valuable as a customer (to Great
Britain), and reduce her ability to pay English bondholders."56
This, of course, flies in the face of the Times's and other com-
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mentators'beliefs that annexation by the United States might bea
commercial good. Moreover, it seems that Smith protests too much
over England's two rather forceless offers t() mediate. After all, even
before the war, Abe~deen warned the Mexican government that
England would not come toher aid.
Although Smith made some points that could have been considered partially valid, he grossly overstated them as he took great
umbrage at the verbal slaps of the English press. It is true that
all the British newspapers examined in this study, especially the
Times, were not particularly amicable toward the United States
or anything it did. It does seem that even though they were unanimous in their contempt for the American government, and, to a
lesser extent, .for the American army, these publications held a
certain deep-lying respect for the United States'as a growingpower.
It was a nation much stronger and more capable than Mexico (or
any otheination in the· New World) and .one which. the newspapers obviously rated well below England. But at the same time
the English saw the United States as an expanding threat, even
to their own country. A strong Anglophobe, Justin Smith failed
to detect this respect-even fear-of what might someday be. As
a result his analysis of British attitudes is neither adequately penetrating, nor sufficiently objective.
.
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St. Vincent Sanatorium, built as an industrial school and later used as an
orphanage. It burned inJuly 185)6. Photo courtesy of the Archives of the
Sisters of Charity, Mt. St. Joseph, Ohio.
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THE SISTERS OF CHARITY
AND ST: VINCENT'S HOSPITAL:
AN AMPLIFiCATION OF SISTER MALLON'S ]Ol..JRNAL

SYTHA MOTrO

As I read the first part of Sister Catherine Mailon's Journal

(NMHR, April 1977), I came to the realization that other readers
might benefit from additional information about -the Sisters of
Charity' and St.. Vincent's Hospital, which' formed the central
P::trt of. Sister Catherine's life. In addition; I feel that some further
discussion, of the journal itself might b~ helpful.
"
" I was pleased ,to receive ,a photostatic copy of Sister Mallon's
handWritten journal with, other. materials, and a letter granting
permission to have it published, in 1964 from the Archives of
the Sisters of' Charity at Mt. St. Joseph, Ohio. I used part of it in
my book No Banners Waving (1966). The New Mexico. His"
torical Review chose Mr. Richter to edit the diary. The original
of the diary still resides in the Ohio archive..
The journal, in,the formof a letter,went from Sister Catherine
to Sister Blandina Segale from Pueblo, Colorado, on September
9, 1901 . Sister Blandina was writing a book (At the End of the
Santa Fe Trail, Columbus, Ohio, 1932) and she had asked Sister
Catherine to help refresh her memory. At that time, Sister Catherine was in the midst of her efforts at the hospital she founded
in Trinidad. Both sisters belonged to fhe Sisters of Charity, acommunity founded by Mother Elizabeth Bayley Seton at Emmitsburgh, Maryland" on February 2, 1812. The first Motherhouse of
the Sisters of Charity in Ohio was at Mt. Harrison in Cincinnati
(also called Mt. St. Vincent) in 185+ The sisters moved to Cedar
Grove in 1857and to the present Motherhouse at Mt. St. J<r.>eph
in 1869.1
.
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Sisters Vincent O'Keefe, Catherine Mallon, Theodosia Farn
and Pauline Leo left Cincinnati and the safe shelter of the Motherhouse on August 21, 1865, to brave unknown dangers and what
they feared was certain death to answer the call of Santa Fe's
Bishop Jean Baptiste Lamy to minister to the sick, the poor, and
the homeless. Archbishop John Baptist Purcell of Cincinnati, a
very dear friend of Bishop Lamy's, advanced the money for the
sisters' fare to Santa Fe, which Bishop Lamy repaid in February
1866.2
Sister Vincent O'Keefe was the first of the Charity postulants
to be received at Cincinnati, so she became the first Superior at
St. Vincent's Hospital at Santa Fe. 3 Sister Vincent was small,
gentle, and courageous; she and Sister Theodosia had nursed
wounded soldiers all though the war just ended. The four sisters
arrived in Santa Fe on September 15, 1865, and were welcomed
and made comfortable by Sister Magdalen, Superior of the Loretto
Academy where they spent the night. The next day Bishop Lamy
called for them and conducted them to the old Episcopate (Bishop's
residence) north of St. Francis Cathedral, as Sister Catherine describes in her journal. 4 The Bishop reserved two rooms for himself and his students until the new Bishop's residence was completed south of the Cathedral in what was known as the Bishop's
Garden; otherwise, the Sisters of Charity had the entire building
to themselves for a hospital.
The first patient was one of the Bishop's students who suffered
from typhoid. Sister Catherine describes how he was shot bya
madman who entered the hospital on Christmas Eve. The student
recovered from both the sickness and the wound. The second
patient was a Mrs. Mary Herbert. The first orphan sent to the
Sisters was a little Navajo girl picked up on a battlefield by General
James Carleton. The number of orphans soon increased to eighteen.
For the first six months of the hospital's existence, the sisters
received no money. The Sisters of Loretto saved some of their
food and gave it to the Sisters of Charity. The Bishop furnished
some wood, meat, and Hour, for which contribution he and his
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students received their meals. Some of the military also boarded
with the sisters, for which the sisters were permitted limited commissary. supplies. 5 Sister Catherine, as she describes in the second
part of her journal in this issue of the Review, went on begging
trips for funds, sometimes accompanied by other sisters, by whatever conveyances upon which she could catch a ride, and most
often by foot. 6
Bishop Lamy helped teach the sisters Spanish and assisted
them in many ways. They always spoke very highly of him 'and
were very grateful for his kindness and generosity, especially for
permitting them to use the old adobe building for 'a hospital without charge. He never demanded anything of them; yet when the
Rev. Stephen Avel, who died in Mora, bequeathed three thousand
dollars to the Sisters of Charity for a hospital, the Bishop accepted
on ,behalf of the archdiocese two thousand dollars' as payment in
hIll for the old adobe hospital building and the land on which
today rests the entire St. Vincent complex. 7
In 1876 the old adobe building was remodeled. New floors,
and large windows and doors replaced the old small ones, a second
story with a covered porch all around appeared, and a pitched
roof wasadded. 8 In that same year, Sister Blandina Segale arrived
in Santa Fe from Trinidad, Colorado, and Sisters Augustine Barron
imdLouise Barron came from the Motherhouse. 9 Sister AugUstine,
like Sisters Vincent and Theodosia, had been a Civil War, nurse,
and had been Assistant Mother for the Community. She was Superior ofSt. Vincent's from 1876 to 1878.
,Also in 1876, General Carleton gave one thousand dollars from
the so-called "California-Fund," appropriated to him for the care
of those' left destitute by battles with the Indians. In that same
year, the territorial legislature passed a bill' allowing St. Vincent's
one hundred dollars per month for the' care ofthe indigent. 1o
When Sister Blandin~ arrived at St. Vincent's she was appalled
by the conditions of extreme poverty and the lack of mostevery~
thing, especially. for the thirty-five' sisters housed in the "L"
shaped adobe building with: its metal roof that stood adjacent' to
the' Cathedral, and in the red brick building in the rear. School
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was conducted by the sisters in a one-room adobe that had formerly
been used for storage. There were, of course, no blackboards, no
desks, and only two textbooks. The refectory contained two6.fteen-foot long tables, no chairs or utensils save spoons, a broken
ironstone china cup, and a plate, which for some meant an old pie
tin. Each girl was served a piece of bread with coffee for breakfast,
a piece of bread with water to drink for dinner, and a piece ofbread
with weak tea for supper. l l
Sister Blandina applied to the school board for a teacher's salary,
which was granted her since some of the wealthier residents paid
tuition for their daughters. The remainder of the money, plus
some of Sister Blandina's salary, was used to purchase books and
supplies for the schooP2 A man she had befriended in Trinidad,
who later had a carpenter's shop in Santa Fe, offered the work and
material for installing blackboards and for repairing the floors
and windows. 13 The sisters also used produce from their small
nearby vegetable garden to help eke out the scanty hospital fare,
but of course this was not available during the fall and winter
months.
At one time, the sisters were faced with the problem of feeding
seventy-two patients, thirty-five orphans, and sixteen sisters with
little food and no money to purchase any. Undaunted, Sister
Blandina raided the Bishop's garden where the vegetables, buried
head down for winter use, were kept. After deliverin'g enough
vegetables for several days, she went to the Bishop and made her
confession of theft. Instead of being angry with her, Bishop Lamy
ordered the gardener to give her all of the vegetables that remained
in his garden. 14
In June 1878 work was begun on an industrial school for orphan
girls. This was a tremendous undertaking, since the work was
begun without a cent in sight to guarantee completion. Plans were
drawn for a three-story brick building, facing Cathedral Place.
It had a mansard slate roof including a cupola, a sewer system,
running water, and was heated and lighted by gas; ina city and
territory where there was neither a gas nor a water works! The
building was completed according to plan in December 1880. 15 In
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practice, the Industrial School was still a drealp.. The greater need
was for more and better hospital facilities, so the completed buildiIlg became an adjunct to St. Vincent's and continued as such until
.
it burned to the g r o u n d . '
In 1882 a two-story red brick building was constructed facing
west, south of the original adobe hospital building, to be the
sisters' convent. Like the Industrial School, however, the new
convent went to higher purpose; as late as 1936 this building
(later named Seton Hall) was used for ambulatory tuberculosis
patients and for aged and infirm clergy.I6
By 1886 the demand for private rooms became so great that
the erection of another hospital building was determined upo~.
Under the direction of Sister Sebastian Shew the two~story red
brick building was begun. Sister Sebastian was recalled to ~e
Motherhouse to assume the duties of Mother Assistant of the
Order before the building was completed. Sister Sebastian was'
replaced by Sister Gabriel who after six months because of ill
health, turned over the work of construction to Sister Magdalena
who continued the construction and succeeded in having it ready
for occupancy in August 1887. This was the "old Hospital" on
Palace avenue which was razed in 1948 to make room for the
present structure. I7
,By 1902 the hospital buildings were filled as more and more
tuberculars were coming to Santa Fe. By 19°7 the need for a
sanatorium was urgent. The plans for it were made and work
begun on a new "L" shaped, seventy-five bed hospital andsana~
torium, that faced Palace Avenue, just· west of the old 1886
hospital. The three-story fireproof brick building. had a tiled roof,
and steam-heated enclosed glass and screen porches, that were
built for out-of-door sleeping as well as living. On the first Roor
Were the business and doctors' offices, clinical and x-ray labOratories, a'nd examination 'aIld drug rooms. Also inCluded were' a
large cheerful living room with fireplace, a well-stocked library,
a billiard room, a spacious lobby; an attractive dining room, airy
whit~tiled kitchen, bakery and special diet kitchens and a sisters:
dining room. (When the nurses' training school opened in 192 I,

a
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Above: St. Vincent's orphans in front of the old orphanage, 1890'

Below: The orphanage for girls, 189 I. Photos courtesy of Sytha Motto.

MOTTO: SISTERS OF CHARITY

235

~his dini~g room was ~sed by the student nurses.) On the second

Roor were the comfortable hoine-like bedrooms, with baths and
sleeping porches, and a chapel. The thira Roor was well equipped
and reserved .for hospital patients,' with diet kItchen,' baths' and
thoroughly up-t<rdate oPerating and delivery room equipment.
Throughout the entire building, now known as Marian Hall,
are beautiful, sometimes elci.borate, mosaic Roors. In 'I 886,a'fter
the "Old Ho~pital" was built the" first old adobe hospital building
became the sisters' quarters and in i 92 I the upper Roor rOOms
were occupied by the student nurses~
,
When Sister Blandina came to Santcl Fe,' the "L" shaped one
story, adobe orphanage housed thirty-five orphan girls. By:I,890
it was sheltering seventy. Obviously the sisters felt the ~ecessity
of providing more comfortable quarters for the orphans but the
losses suffered by fire and the debts incutred for the construction
of the hospitals were so great that the assuming of any further obligation seemed imprudent. But, when in I890 the Rev. Father
Thom~ A. Hayes gave a large sum of money to build an orphanage, they were relieved of their embarrassment and began the construction of a large tw<rstory brick building that could accomoda,te
sixty or seventy orphans or indigent girls. They were fed, clothe9'
arid instructed in the usual branches of education, cooking, baking,
sewing, ahd the customary household duties. The new orphanage
consisted ofa dormitory, baths, kitchen, dining room, and class~
rooms. IS The' old orphanage was used for storage until I 92 I' w]1en
it was remodelled' by tearing down the north "L". A metal' ~ip
roof was put on, the outside and inside walls were repaired, <:L't1g
the inside of the building was remodelled to contain two be&
rooms
.
.,and baths, .a class room and recreation room for the'studeI1:t
nurses.' '
..
."'

.~
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SISTER CATHERINE MALLON'S JOURNAL
(PART Two)

EDITED BY THOMAS RICHTER

Sister Catherine Mallon came to New Mexico in a party of four
nurses at the request of Archbishop Jean Baptiste Lamy to organize
a hospital in Santa Fe. They left Ohio in August of 1865 and arrived
in: September to found St. Vincent's Hospital. Sister Catherine's
account of her journey and her subsequent service in New Mexico
and Colorado was written for Sister Blandina Segale who had served
with her in Santa Fe and was in the process of assembling her memoirs, later published as At the End of the Santa Fe Trail (Columbus,
Ohio, 1932).
Sister Catherine's journal was -graciously made available to the
New Mexico Historical Review by Sytha Motto, whose comments
and amplification of the journal appear just preceding this section
of the diary. The editor also wishes to thank Mrs. Motto for her critical reading of the journal, which eliminated errors at some points and
clarified uncertainties at others. The first half of "Sister Catherine
Mallon's Journal" appeared in the April 1977 issue of the NMHR
(5 2 : 2 ).

.

.

~ STARTED from Santa Fe in June. Our first day's travel was in
an open wagon, with soapboxes for seats; we had to travel two days
in wagons before coming to the railroad,39 and, as we had rio money
to pay oUf way on the road, we had to beg a pass,40 but the ticket
agent would not be home before twelve p.m. so we waited at -the
station until he came; there was a gentleman with us who interNote: The original of the journal here presented is in the Archives of the
Sisters of Charity, Mt. St. Joseph (Cincinnati), Ohio, not in the Archives
of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe as reported in the introduction to' Part 1.
The editor regrets this error.
.
.
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ceded for us so, after considerable hesitation on the part of the
agent, a~d explanations of ours, we got the pass to Durango and
back; but when we got on the train the conductor took the pass
and did not return it; I demanded the pass, and he refused to give
itup.Finally he relented and gave me the pass. Well, it started to
rain, and it came down in such torrents that everything seemed to
be swept away, and there we had to remain for nearly a day; and
as the passengers were very hungry, they made their way to a
section house nearby, and ate a barrel of crackers that the poor
woman had for her boarders.
Well, after a long delay we got started and reached Durang041
in safety; but the streets were Hooded and it was pouring; and we
were pretty wet when we got to the house where we received
hospitality. Mr. Kigan was a friend of the Santa Fe sisters, and,
having met us on the train, requested us to stop at his house, which
we did. Now the priest of Durango had rooms there also so when
he heard we were coming, he was determined we should not beg
in his parish;42 so he stayed up as he did not have the patience to
wait until morning. Notwithstanding the fact that it was very late
and we were weary and wet, we had to appear before his reverance
to hear his refusal. I simply told him we did not come to collect
from his parishioners, but the railroad men who were working in
and around Durango; [I also mentioned] that Some of those men
were nursed from death to life by the sisters of Santa Fe when
they had not a dollar to pay for the care lavished upon them; and I
finisb~d by saying it would be the worst thing he ev~r did as the
men would be so indignant that they would never contribute to his
church or himself; "for they well know that if they have broken
legs, or are sick and helpless, it is not to you but to the sisters they
must go for· care and attention." Finally we retired to bed about
twelve, leaving the reverend gentleman somewhat mollified; and,
as the next morning was Sunday, we went to church where, after
mass and on our way back to Mr. Kigan's, many of the congregationgave us a warm welcome, and many seemed anxious to have
tile honor of entertaining us; but Mr. Kigan would not hear of anybody entertaining us but himself.
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The reverend father finally consented to let us collect, and on
Monday morning we started out bright and early to begin our not
very pleasant task; we were far from home, and very few knew us;
consequently we had to bear many rude and unkind remarks. We
came to a party of men who vowed they would never again give a
cent to sisters; at this remark I became very indignant and said,
"Ah! boys, it is a poor return to make to the Sisters of Santa Fe,
who have made so many sacrifices for you, if not for you at least
such as you; [who] even gave up their beds to make you comfortable." All at once there was an exclamation, "oh sisters, are you
from Santa Fe? Please excuse me, we thought you were from [such
and] such a place, and we have vowed never to give them a dollar
because they did so and so to such and such; but the Sisters of
Santa Fe, we have heard of their kindness to the sick and injured,
and we will do anything, for them; put dQwn my name for five
dollars, mine for three, and mine for two;" and in this way the
poor fellows tried to atone for the hasty words they had spoken. I
tried hard to excuse the sisters [of the other order] by saying that
the sisters would never refuse admission to the person referred to,
if they could avoid it; but there was no changing-their opinion. So
after that, we used to tell all that we were from Santa Fe; and so
had.verylittle trouble. When we happened to meet any of those
we had nursed, they were profuse in their praises ,of the kindness
they received in our hospital, and so [they] encouraged the others
to give generously and help on the good work.
We went to the Hi[gh]land Mary mine43 and several others in
the San-Juan country; in some ofthem we went away under the
mountains. -The reflections one makes from the sight of the hardships, which those men endured in their search for gold are often
very salutary, and we often had a chance to make them. And the
poor women we met in our travels, with five or six children, and
they trying to cook for tWenty, thirty, and forty merL Oh! How
often I thanked the good God for saving me from such a fate. 44
And I often wished that soine of our sisters could see what we saw
that they might-the better realize the great gift bestowed by God
in calling th~m to the religious state. When we met in little tents
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with exiles [workers imported] from Mexico, as we sometimes did,
beautiful young women, who had left mother, father, and friends,
and all that was near and dear for the sake of a man who might,
and did often, forsake and abuse them; and when I considered and
saw the inconvenience they put up with, and the hardships they
endured for the love of the creature, I felt that whatever I did for
the love of the Creator was nothing because of the infinite distance
between one and the other. I should have mentioned in this place
that the people of Durango, as also those of Silverton,45 were very
anxious that our sisters should come and establish hospitals at both
these places for at that time there were no sisters there.
Well, we finished our task in this direction, where we were very
successful, and prepared to start for another; but the railroad and
bridges were all washed away, and the whole scene was one of
desolation; but we had to make the best of it so off we started,
plowing through mud, climbing over broken bridges, tugging
along for about a mile and a half, for that was the nearest point the
cars could come. Now we had to think of getting a pass on the main
line,46 and so had to see the general manager, who we were told
we would find by going to Colorado Springs;47 but when we got
there, found to our great disappointment that he was in Denver.
So off we started to Denver, and, after encountering some difficulties, succeeded in getting the favor desired; and here I wish to state
that during this trip we got seven passes to so many different points,
not one of which cost us a cent, verifying the saying, "ask andye
shall receive,"in temporals as well as spirituals. No wonder my
heart overRowed with gratitude to God and His creatures; when I
reRect on the great favors I have received from His mighty Hands
and from those of His children, and, at the same time, am filled
with fear that I have not complied with the obligations· I imposed
on myself by promising to pray for all.
We started from Denver to Leadville,48 stopping on the way to
collect. I shall never forget our experience at Brown's Canyon. We
had some very narrow escapes from climbing to get where the men
were working. They were generous and kind, but as they could not
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accommodate us, and, as it was getting late, we had to make our
way accompanied by two Irish boys to a point at which the train
was to pass on its way to Leadville;49 and, as there was no station
nearby, they had to flag the train. Weary and footsore we arrived at
Leadville at twelve in the night, and received gracious welcome
from Sister Bridget who was then superlor of the hospital.50 This
dear Sister not'only made us welcome, but seemed willing that we
should collect there if we so wished; and the good Father Robinson 51 treated us with courtesy and kindness. We made the hospital
oUf stopping point as there were many branches of railroad on
which we wished to collect; and after. finishing one, we had to
come back to start for another; but each time we received such a
hearty welcome that it was like being at home.
_
We went up to Breckinridge,52 up to Kokoma,53 and on to the
Midland Railway;54 it would riot be possible for me to describe the
difficulties and hardships we went through during this trip. I
remember one day we were being driven from one camp to another
in an open wagon; and, as theroads were very bad, Sister Martha5~
was thrown out of the wagon and the wheel went over her leg. I
can never forget the anguish of those.moments; the thought that
dear Sister's leg might be broken, in the wilds so many hundreds
of miles from home, was terrible. And how heartfelt were our
thanksgivings to the Almighty when we found ~at such was not
the case. Dear Sister Martha! When I reflect on her great patience
in the trials and hardship of that trip, I feel she was a saint, or she
would never have shown such fortitude. It often: happened, when
we got into a camp somewhat late, our bed would be a comfort[er}
spread on the hardground under a tent, and another [comforter}
for a pillow; indeed I remember having a bag of flour for my pillow
one night that we slept in the tent where they keptthe groceries;
butthey usually gave us the'best they had. Islept another night in
a grading camp with a bag of nails for my pillow, it was not their
intention to give such a hard pillow, it was just tossed in there,
and I utilized it for want of something better; 'for when one is
very tired, after walking over miles of work, pleading the cause
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of charity, and riding in an .open wagon, or on a hand car in all
kinds of weather, any kind of accommodation is welcome to the
poor weary body.
And very often it required the example of our Divine Model to
brace us up in the humiliations, toils, and hardships of those begging trips, and, what was equally hard to bear, the taunts of
thoughtless sisters, I might rather say heartless, who would tell
you, you liked such. a life; and yet those good sisters never seemed
willing to make any sacrifice themselves. It is somewhat painful to
have to say such things of spouses of the crucified God, but yet it
is true; and I believe in speaking the truth even if it does hurt.
It was on this trip that we went to the Gunnison country56 where
we had a very hard time especially in the Black Canyon. 57 On one
occasion we gotinto the camp late in the afternoon, and got a very
cold reception from the contractor who, from all we could see, was
very bigoted and bitter; and, as it was a very dreary lonely place, we
felt very badly, but as soon as the men came from work, and
gathered around to welcome us, everything was changed as there
were about a hundred Irishmen in the camp; we felt secure. So
after awhile they set about preparing our bed, and this they did by
cutting down branches from the trees, which were very numerous,
and [byJbuilding up [the branches] until they got a heap about
two feet high; and this they did to keep the reptiles from crawling
upon us for, according totheir statement, they were very numerous
there. Then a comfort[er] or two was placed over the branches, and
another for pilloW's; and so our bed was finished, and I assure you
we slept soundly and felt as secure as if in our convent home for
we knew we had as many protectors as there were Irishmen in the
camp. God ever bless those poor fellows for the esteem and respect
theyhave ever shown for the sisters, and their generosity in contributing to our institutions. That night, or rather that evening, we
collected, and all or nearly all put down their names forone, two,
or three dollars; but as the men did not have the money to give, the
contractor was to stop it out of their wages, and send it to us; but
we never got a cent of it.
Well, the next morning we expected them to send us to the next
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camp which was about seven miles off, as all the other camps had
done; but instead of doing so, we were told we would have to walk
it as all their wagons were in Gunnison. They told us that, if we
would climb the mountain; it would shorten our journey three or
four miles so we concluded to do so. At first it did not seem so
dangerously steep; but as we advanced we were terrified at the task
before us; and each one trembled for the other's safety, but we
did not care to return to the camp again. It seemed as if even a goat
never scaled its;heights so we prayed as never before, and climbed
and prayed; sometimes resting toget breath. What serious thoughts
passed through our minds during those hours of danger for, had
those little twigs and projecting rocks, to which we clung, given
way, we should have been dashed to destruction, and no one
would have even known what became of us. My anxiety was
about dear Sister Martha on account of her age; and probablyher's
was about me. But the good God, for whose sake we undertook the
trip and the hardships it entailed, came to our aid, and we luckily
escaped the dangers that threatened us. But when we got to the
top of that mountain, we beheld another confronting us, but not
so terrible in aspect. So we knelt and gave thanks to the Mighty
One to whose protecting care we felt we owed our safety, and
prayed for strength to face. the difficulties before us; and they were
.
not few.
After praying and resting for some time, we started to climb the
mountain number two which was easy in comparison with the first,
buf we were tired and weary and our ascent was slow; but finally
we reached the top not far from the main road, and to our great
joy saw a wagon coming along; we now felt. we would get· the
infofIIlation we wanted' as to the whereabouts of the camp to which
we were going, and perhaps a ride, which indeed we did for about
a mile, for they had to turn off another way. Well, we walked· and
walked; and finally began to thirik'that we could gono farther as
we were ready to drop On' the road side; and the wonder was that
we did not from fatigue and hunger, but here again our merciful
Father came to our assistance, animating us to keep on, for soon
we would be where ",re, could find rest. How often did we have
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need to call to mind, during that trip, the example of our Divine
Lord? At last we got to the camp where we were kindly received
for, whenever we met. the poor Irish, their hearts and hands were
open to us. They made us very comfortable for the night; [we]
got a good rest, and [we] were ready for a fresh start in the morning. They furnished us with a horse and wagon; and we started
for the next camp which was a considerable distance.
It would not be possible to describe the dangers we encountered
from bad roads, lonely places, and other causes. There were places
where one mis-step of the horse, or the least carelessness on part of
the driver, and we would be dashed into eternity. How often during those weeks and months did weseem to stand face to face with
death from Hying rocks, for often they came down in showers,
[and] from immense heights where the men were blasting,
crushing all before them and very often the poor men. But our
dear Lord brought us safely through, notwithstanding the many
dangers we encountered, which it would not be possible for me to
enumerate in the limited time. at my command.
It was in the wilds of the Gunnison country that we were refused
lodging by persons living on farms; we were so far off from any
camp, and the roads were so bad, that we could not travel after
dark, so we were obliged either to sleep in the wagon, which was
very unsafe as the place was wild and lonely, or ask lodging at
some farmer's house, which we did; but each and all refused us;
they seemed to be afraid of us. The man who drove us declared he
would not leave us alone so after traveling some time we saw a
tent, and there found a family traveling like ourselves; and they
kindly offered to give us shelter, such as it was, in return for which
they got many a prayer. What a night that was! There was a wayside whiskey den not far from our little tent; and such fighting,
shooting, and cursing as was carried on during the whole of the
night that the life was nearly frightened out of us; and how we
longed for the day that came at last, and you can imagine how
fervently we thanked God for our deliverance. We returned to
Gunnison, and, as we had finished the collecting in those parts,
set out for home; and you can imagine 40w the thought of getting
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home delighted us after an absence of almost three months. How
many Masses, Holy Communions, and spiritual exercises we
missed during those trips, and we did"not then have the privilege
of making up our communions as we have now. But I suppose
our good Master will supply all since it was done through obedience
for His dear sake and the good of our dear community. I often
wonder if, when I die, our good superiors and sisters will not offer
special prayers, Holy Communions, and Masses for one who has
lost so many in the service of the community. I trust our dear Lord
will inspire them to do so. Well, we got safely home, and what was
ourjoy on finding there dear Mother Josephine, Sister Antonia and
Mary Agnes, and the good Father Burnes? We soon forgot the
hardships ofthe trip, but Sister Martha did not get over its effects
for a long time: 58
Sister Augustine and I had some narrow escapes on a trip we
made together. In crossing the Rio Grande the driver got into deep
water, and it" seemed as if there was no escape from drowning; our
fright was the greater as a few days before seven men were
drowned trying to cross it. I have often thought that we never pray
aright but when in danger; it seems as if our whole souls go oilt to
God in supplication when we stand face to face with death, and
feel that no other power but His can save; and as I have.often
been in that position, I have realized the mightiness of prayer in
those awful moments. We escaped from the river in some miraculous way, and continued our journey towards the camp; and as
the way leading thereto w?s over an immense precipice, we had to
go very cautiously; hut all of a sudden we heard an explosion; and
the rocks were flying in all directions; the poor horses were terrified
and seemedabotit to plunge into the abyss below,. but some
mighty power seemed to stay their flight; and we were saved again,
thanks to the Almighty one who seemed to be with, and guide us
everywhere. Oh! May I never forget the miseries of those days so
that I may always present a grateful, loving homage to my God for
so wonderfully protecting us in the many dangers through which
we had to pass in those days of trial. Well, the men in camp saw
our danger, and came to our assistance. They unhitched the
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horses, and one led the horses, and two drew the carriage to the
camp where we were hospitably treated during our short stay.
Dear Sister Augustine realized during that trip that it was not
so very pleasant to be traveling through the wilds, seeking for
money to supply the needs of the hospital. If those who came after
us could only realize what the first sisters went through to build
up the different houses in [the] West, they would not so easily
find fault with what they find there, but would rather thank the
good God andthe dear sisters who toiled so hard and faithfully to
make it whatit is. They would also offer fervent prayers for those
poor, hard working men, without whose generous contributions
we could have done very little. May God bless every one of them,
and may we never forget the debt of gratitude we owe them,
which I fear we too often do. They gave us the temporal help vve
then needed, and in return they asked and were promised the
spiritual help of our prayers.
I do not intend to mention anything that happened on the trips
which Sister Blandina and I made together as I know she will and
can do it far better than I can.
In 1888 I was sent by dear Mother Mary Paul to Albuquerque
to open the hospital, or rather to transform the Academl 9 into a
hospital, which was indeed a difficult task as there were few who
saw the need of the hospital, and many were very much opposed
to the change as they saw plainly the need of the school; and
among the many [were] the Jesuit Fathers. And besides, the
Academy was not suitable, and never could be made so. It can be
easily imagined how unpleasant my situation was, but I felt that
God would fix everything in His own good time if only we prayed
and trusted. It was very perplexing to encounter so many difficulties as well as opposition, and, being so far from superiors, it was
hard to decide what to do or how to act. So I consulted with a few
of the sisters as to what was best to do. They thought with me that
the best thing would be to write to Mother, and explain everything,
and in the meantime make a novena that God's will might be
made known to all. This we did and awaited patiently the decision
of the council, which came the Saturday before the opening of
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school; and the decision was to continue the school, and wait a
more opportune time for the hospital.60
A few days after, I got a dispatch to go to Trinidqd to take
charge of the hospital,61 a thing that had not yet existed. I then
little dreamed of the heavy cross awaiting me there. I went, however, feeling that the weaker the instrument chosen for the task
assigned, the more powerfully would be the Almighty help, provided we trusted in Him. When I arrived in Trinidad, I found
that they had commenced to dig the foundation. Father Pinto had
the promise of a few thousand dollars; I had nothing to offer but
a good will to do and dare anything and everything tha,t would
make the undertaking a success. I found in Father Pinto a faithful
worker and a kind father who did everything in his power to secure
success. What shall I say of the good Dr. [?] Beshore who made it
pos~ible for us by donating the first twelve lots and' afterwards
twenty-three? The people all seemed very anxious for the hospital,
and most willing to help in the good work. So we commenced by
getting up a fair which was a good success as we realized two
thousand dollars; and so the work went on. I staited out to beg, but
being all alone I ,had to provide a prudent companion which I
found in dear Mrs. Conroy, who with her horse and buggy was
always ready to accompany me wherever I went. She was indeed
a generous friend and kind benefactor, and much of the success
was due to her; she was always willing to share the hardship and
dangers of such trips, and sometimes they were not few; we had
some narrow escapes from runaways. Miss Kate Folley was also
very kind, going with me when Mrs. Conroy could not.
I· had many trying experiences during the process of building;
many were the difficulties to be overcome; it was harder to collect
a hundred, now, than.a thousand when collecting for Santa Fe. I
sometimes came to the convent from my begging trip almost frozen,
and the dear kind sisters had to help thaw me out, as, they called it.
I hadto climb on all fours in snow and frost to get where I wanted
to, go. Who shall ever know the hardships and humiliations I
endured to get that hospital built? But' the good Father Pinto
[SiC]62 gave substantial
worked hard also, and good Father Mara
.
,
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assistance, also, by lending money to continue the work. I must not
forget St. Anthony of Padua's share in the work. 63 It came about
this way: the amount of land donated by Dr. Beshore being twelve
lots, it seemed very small for such a buildi~g; so I asked Father
Pinto to ask the doctor for more, but father declined; so I turned to
St. Anthony, and asked ,his help. I commenced a novena in his
honor, for this intention, and the morning after the novena closed,
I went to the doctor, made, my request, and got twenty-three lots
more, in all thirty-five. So you see, St. Anthony had a large share
in its success. After all, God, St. Anthony, Father Pinto, and Dr.
Beshore were the principal actors; and the people of Trinidad C<T
operated generously. I have often said I would make them all saints
and millionairs [sic], were it in my power. God bless them all is my
heartfelt prayer.
My dear Sister Blandina, I have tried to give you a brief sketch
of the past; I know you will find many mistakes, grammatical, of
composition, and of spelling; but you could hardly expect it otherwise. Had I plenty of time at my disposal, I might do a little better.
When you receive this, please write and let me know; as I shall
[be] anxious, fearing it might fall into other hands.

NOTES
39. From Chama, New Mexico, the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad
extended its San Juan extension to Durango, Colorado, in 1881. East of
Chama, the railroad already ran to the main north/south line. Tivis E.
Wilkins, Colorado Railroads: Chronological Development (Boulder, 1974),

P·35·
40. Begging railroad passes was a common practice for the sisters. In
July, 1883, Sister Pauline and Sister Blandina received passes on the Mexican Central Railroad from £1 Paso, Texas, into Chihuahua, Mexico. Segale,
End of Trial, pp. 240-41.
.
41. Durango developed when Denver and Rio Grande construction
crews arrived in 1880. That action blotted out Animas City whose town
leaders had not encouraged the railroad. Robert G. Athearn, The Coloradans (Albuquerque, 1976), p. 138.
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42. Perhaps the priest knew about the large sums begged by the sisters
in other towns and' camps.
43. Listed as a producing mine in. Hinsdale County. Hinsdale County
stands between 'Silverton and Gunnison. :Frank Fossett, Colorado: Its Gold
and Silver Mines, Farms, and Stock Ranges, and Health and Pleasure Resor:ts, Tourist's Guide to the Rocky Mountains, 2nd ed. (New York, 1880),

p.
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44. Sister seemed to consider her vocation as a liberated calling for
women.
45. Silverton exists fifty miles north of Durango on the Denver 'and
Rio Grande Railroad. Fora description of mines near Silverton see Fossett,
Colorado, PP.)25-32.
46. The Denver and Rio Grande railway, running from l~ueblo to
Denver,·Colorado.Fossett, Colorado, p. ,I I.
47. Seventy-five miles south of Denver, Colorado Springs was a health
resort by 1879. Fossett, Colorado, pp. 36-4°'
48. Although Leadville's boom began.in 1877, railroad service did not
reach the town until 188o. By then, the silver mines rivaled :Nevada~s 'Comstock Lode for the greatest amount of silver ,production iin 'the nation. In
1880 Leadville counted 14,820 citizens, the second largest'town in Colorado.
Rodman Paul, Mining Frontier:sof the Far West 1848-1880 (New York,
1963), pp. 127-129; For an 1879 description of 'Leadville, see .Fossett, Colorado, pp. 97-98, 417-18.
49. On July 22,1880, the first passenger train from Denverauived in
Leadville on the Denver and 'Rio Grande Railroad. Wilkins, Colorado .'Railroads, p. 33.
50. Five Sisters of Charity established a hospital soon after Leadville
boomed in 1878. Bishop Machebeuf in early 1879 reported them overworked. Howlett, Machebeuf, pp. 387-88.
5I. Father Robinson arrived to serve the Leadville area in 1874. He
quickly established a church in Leadville during the 1878 boom. Howlett,
Machebeuf, p. 387.
52. Breckinridge exists thirty-two miles northeast from Leadville, a
business center for the Summit County mines in the Blue River headwaters.
Fossett, Colorado, p. 88.
53. West of Breckinridge sat Kokomo, twenty miles north of Leadville
in the Ten Mile mining district which boomed in the early 1880s. Fossett,
Colorado, p. 97.
. 54. In 1886 construction began on the Colorado Midland Railroad,
the first standard gauge line into the Colorado mountilins. In 1887 it
reached Leadville, continuing west to Glenwood Springs. Wilkins, Coloraao Railroads, pp. 57, 63·
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"55. In December, 1876, Sister Martha received a transfer from Trinidad to Santa Fe along with Sister Blandina. Segale, End of Trail, p. 87.
56. Located southwest of Leadville, the Gunnison district boomed by
"i88oencouraging a "human 'tidal wave'" to arrive. Fossett, Colorado, p. 566.
57. Scenic Black Canyon of the Gunnison River, situated between
Gunnison and Montrose, Colorado, presently a National Monument. Sue
Duane Vanderbusche, "Man Against the Black Canyon," The Colorado
Magazine, 50 (Spring 1973): I I 7-41.
58. Sister Martha died on March 18, 188+ Defouri, Catholic Church,
p." 1°3,
59. On August 21, 1882, Sisters Mary Josephine, Pauline, Gertrude,
Agnes Cecilia, Mary Aloque, and Blandina received orders to open a school
in Albuquerque. On September 21, 1882, school opened in Old Town, replacing a school run by Jesuit priests. Segale, End of Trail, pp.214, 226-27.
The Sisters planned an academy for New Town. Defouri, Catholic Church,

P· 1 °4·
60. IilMay, 1889, the Albuquerque sisters decided to exchange an
industrial school site for land near the Sandia Mountains for a proposed
hospital. Segale, End of Trail, p. 334.
61. Sister Blandina in August, 1889, received orders back to Trinidad
to teach school. Sister Catherine apparently accompanied her to Trinidad.
Segale, End of Trail, p. 335.
62. Sister Blandina reported that Rev. M. Marra, S.J., served in New
Mexico in July, 1882. Segale, End of Trail, pp. 214-15.
63. Saint Anthony of Padua, a native of Lisbon, Portugal, lived from
1195-1231. Travelers and people seeking lost items pray to him.
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THE COLORADANS. By Robert G. Athearn. Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1976, Pp. viii, 430. Illus., maps, bibliog. essay, index.
$15. 00 .
"WE DO NOT propose to eat, drink or sleep with one, and neither do we
believe it right that our children should receive theire~ucation in Negro
classes." The preceding editorial assertion -was made to Colorado readers
over a hundred years ago, despite a tone reminisc~nt of the tumultuolls
months and years that followed the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown
vs. Board of Education of Topeka. The author was William Byeis; editor
of Colorado's oldest newspaper, the Rocky Mountain News; the year was
1866when many of Byers's fellow Coloradans also opposed racial integration in the young mountain territory. The provocative quote 'is typical of
thos,e found in. Robert G. Athearn's entertaining book. Athearn's history
would be called a human interest one in journalistic parlance; indeed, as the
title proclaims it is about Coloradans (the ordinary as well as the illustrious).
Athearn does two admirable things in his history of the Centennial State,
succeeding at the first better than the second. He incorpOrates minority
groups into the state's historical mainstream. Blacks, Chicanos, and women,
forinstance, are recognized for the important contributions they have made.
He also makes an obvious effort to avoid the Denver-centered approach, all
_too typical of past histories of the state. Consequently, h~ discusses the
successful efforts of Coloradans to establish Mesa Verde National Park on
the Western Slope. He chronicles the 'unsuccessful attempt of the Salvation Army to establish permanently a cooperative farm community along
the Arkansas River on the State's eastern plains. Both of these efforts of
the early twentieth century have been all but forgotten; both were made
many miles from the front-range area, or the region extending from: Pueblo
to Boulder where most historians of Colorado history have concentrated
their endeavors.
. -
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There is one disadvantage to Athearn's approach: it fails to produce the
traditional chronological state history. But it does illustrate major trends,
such as the attitude of Coloradans toward growth and development. During
most of the nineteenth century expansion was promoted, between the two
world wars many wanted to discourage newcomers; after World War II
the boosters, promoters, and developers were preeminent; in the 1970S an
increasing number of Coloradans had misgivings about uncontrolled and
unplanned growth. Finally, while Athearn's history loses something in the
area of systematic chronology, he does manage to include the state's major
personalities and events in a volume enhanced by a writing style that is
always engaging.

University of Northern Colorado

ROBERT W. LARSON

QUETZALCOATL AND GUADALUPE: THE FORMATION OF MEXICAN NATIONAL
CONSCIOUSNEsS,153'1-1813. By Jacques Lafaye. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1976. Pp. xxx, 336. Illus., notes, index. $22.00.
THIS IS a facinating inquiry into the spiritual history of Mexico. Taking
religiOUS beliefs as the touchstone of national consciousness, Jacques Lafaye
sets out to study the development of those particular sacred flames that
ignited Mexican "mariolatry"-worship of the Virgin of Guadalupe, who
combined pre-Columbian and Spanish attributes and thereby bestowed
divine grace upon ;the Mexican patria-and the legendary appearance in
Mexico of Christ's disciple, Saint Thomas, in the form of a priest of the
pre-Columbiandivinity, Quetzalc6atl.
The historiographical treatment of the Mexican Guadalupan cult is
e~pecially im~ginative. The author retraces the stages of evolution in the
cult .from Indian .reverence for a replica of the Spanish Guadalupe at the
hill-of Tepeyac (the holy place of the Aztec mother goddess) to themiraculous:painting of the dark-skinned virgin on the cloak of a humble Indian
(a belief which se~ms to have originated in the mid-seventeenth century
durin,g a general "flowering of Mexican sensibility") to the patroness of
Mexican patriotism. For .evidence, Lafaye relies heavily on the religious
writings printed in Mexico during .the colonial period which are catalogued
in Jose Toribio Medina's La imprenta en Mexico.
Lafaye's work has much in common with the monumental studies of the
Spanish historian, Americo Castro. Both make brilliant use of literary
sources in their search for the "spiritual dwelling place" or "human climate"
of whole societies. However, Lafaye lacks the encyclopedic knowledge of
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popular culture which allowed Castro to make suggestive links between the
literati arid the popular mind. Lafaye is inclined to accept religious literature in colonial Mexico as the expression of collective consciousness even
though lie knows. that his writers comprise a' very narrow slice of. creole
society; whose works were not widely circulated· beyond monastic.Walls. It.
seems to me that this acceptance. of religious tracts as the primary evidence
of collective consciousness leads Lafaye to overestimate the social rolee of
the regular clergy and to assume rather than demonstrate the broader. application of his sources. Here· are a few ex cathedra' assertions about social
process that stem from the author's enthusiasm for his ecclesiastical sources:
('I), The. expulsion of the Jesuits: gave rise to; a "national" movement-tIthe
spontaneous reaction of aU the social, regional, and ethnic groups. of New
Spain" (p. lOr); (2), "One must understand the immense role of the friars
in· New Spain's. life· to: realize the extent of the revolution caused by unwiSe governmental measures" (p. 116); (3), "A Virgin with an olive. complexion who. first appeared to an Indian, Guadalupe made creoles, mestizos;
and! Indians; a'single people' united by the same charismatic faith" (p. 288Y;.
and (4)', "The cult of Guadalupe was the spiritual aspect of the protest
against the colonial regime" (p. 299).
.
Without connecting his religious writings to evidence of p@puIar beliefs,
practices, and politieal' behavior, the role of the Virgin of Guadalupe in
national as distinguished' from collective consciousness remains to be demonstrated. Lafaye recognizes the potential value of Inquisition records for
establishing popular beliefs but makes little use of them and no use at all
of the civil; and criminal records that might document religious beliefs and
messianic movements among the laymen, of rural and urban Mexico in the'
colonial period.
University of Colorado

WILLIAM TAYLOR

FREMONT: EXPLORER FOR A RESTLESS NATION. By Feral Egan. Garden
City: DouBleday & Co., 1977.
xv, 58.2. Illus., notes, index, maps.
$14·95·

Pr.

'WiTH SKILL and imagination, Ferol Egan has woven the strands of John C,
Fremont's life (r.8I3c90) into a mostreadable and. moving biography. Without a: doubt,. the author is a talented writer and the book should have.
popular appeal in spite of its uneven nature. The dust jacket touts it as. it
"full" biography, but 414 of the 524 pages of text are devoted to the five
western expeditions. Even here the emphasis is on the first three and' on
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Fremont's court-martial in 1847, which resulted from his refusal to recognize Stephen Watts Kearny as his commander-in-chief in California following its conquest
This heavy emphasis on exploration is due not only to the obvious predilections of the author, but also to the fact that Fremont's most moilUmental success came as an explorer in the West. At the same time, this
period of his life is the most richly covered by primary printed sources:
Fremont's official reports to the government of his 1842 and 1843-44
surveys, his Memoirs (although they really do not go beyond 1847 and are
largely a duplication of the Reports), the court-martial record, the correspondence printed in Jackson and Spence's Expeditions, the letters of
Theodore Talbot, and the accounts of Charles Preuss, the Kern brothers,
and Solomon N. Carvalho.
What is truly needed in a "new" biography is a greater edification of
Fremont's other roles. This Mr. Egan has not done. For the presidential
campaign of 1856 and the Civil War activities, he does not go beyond
Allan Nevins, who at the time of his death was engaged in revising his own
1955 edition of Fremont; on the Arizona territorial governorship and on
the complicated Mariposa dealings, he adds nothing to Bert Fireman in
the first instance and to Gregory Crampton's 1941 dissertation in the
second. Lacking are references to the pathmarker's part in various railroad
schemes or of an 1888 vision of making money by settling Belgian colonists
on land in southern California. To work through the scattered manuscripts
and put all the pieces together would be terribly time-consuming.
The reviewer would also like to see either documentation or better documentation for some of the interesting, but perhaps questionable, bits of
information. What are the sources for the statements that Major Pryor's
death made it possible for the Fremonts to marry legally (p~ 7); "Mrs.
Benton let it be known that the widower President [Van Buren] of the
United States would be a proper match for Jessie" (p. 41); William Bent
told Fremont that he had destroyed old Bent's Fort because it "was lousy
with fever" [cholera] (p. 496); and that Alexis Godey was on the fifth
expedition (p. 494)? Fremont, in 1855, and his men,Kit Carson, Thomas
S. Martin, and Thomas E. Breckenridge, in their old age all mention
conducting vicious raids against the California Indians in 1846 (pp. 325-26,
338-40). The author is unquestioning in his acceptance of these statements,
although there seems to be no collaborating contemporary evidence.
.. In summary, there are some imbalances, some errors in fact, some
questionable interpretations, but the book captures well the "peaks of
glory" and the "valleys of despair" of an epic figure.
University of Illinois

MARY LEE SPENCE
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PAPERS ON THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF BLACK MESA, ARIZONA. Edited by
George Gumerman and Robert C. Euler. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1976. Pp. xii. Illus., maps, bibliog. ClOth $10.00,
paper, $5.95.
THIS VOLUME may be of interest to historians for it illustrates the direction
archeology has i:ake~ in the last decade. No longer are archeological investigations oriented solelytoward excavating prehistoric remains, describing
the features and artifacts uncovered, and correlating this information with
results of other excavations. Now, in many ~ases,hypotheticalmodels are
created to be tested, cultural-environmental relationships are interpreted,
and social relationships are postulated. Statistical analyses and computer
programs are utilized in archeological interpretation.
The Black Mesa Project, which conducted the investigations reported
upon in this paper, is a long-term interdisciplinary research program performing salvage archeology on Black Mesa, northeastern Arizona, because
of the strip rillning of coal there by the Peabody Coal Company. Because
the coal cOInpany is mining and otherwise developing a large area of Black
Mesa, covering most of the environmental subzones of the region, arche~
ologists are afforded an opportunity to survey and excavate a large sample
of the prehistoric remains existing on the Mesa.
.
.
.This publication, one of a series dealing with Black Mesa, contains a
number of specialized reports. The lengthiest is a descriptive account of
the historic and prehistoric remains located along the 274 mile right-of-way
of a pipeline built to carry coal slurry from Black Mesa to the Colorado
River in Nevada. Six Anasazi sites could not be avoided by the pipeline
and were excavated. Three other papers in the volume are more theoretical
and speculative dealing with paleoenvironmental and cultural correlates,
a model of prehistoric population growth,. and aspects of ancient social
organization on Black Mesa. Finally, there is a summary of Black Mesa
cultural history, based upon project activities, ranging from Basketmaker
II through Pueblo III times. Abandonment of the area by circa A.D. 1 150
appears to have been due to worsening climate and overpopulation.
The reports are well written and edited and· are presented in excellent
format.
University of New Mexico

ROBERT H.· LISTER

INDIAN RAWHIDE: AN AMERICAN FOLK ART. By Mable Morrow. Norman:
The University of Oklahoma Press, 1975. Pp. xii, 243. 'Illus., chait.,
bibliog., index. $20.00.
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A CENTURY AGO women of more than forty Indian tribes of the Great Plains
and Columbia. River Valley transported and stored meat and other dried
foods" blankets, clothing, and other useful items in. tough waterproof
cases made of folded pieces of buffalo rawhide. Mter the buffalo disappeared they substituted cattle or horsehide and they continued to decorate
the exteriors of these rawhide envelopes with brightly painted geometric
designs.
It seems proper that the nrst book-length study of these painted rawhide
cases should' be that of Mable Morrow, for no one else lias studied this
truly American folk art in. such close association with its creators" or as
intensively over as long a period of time as has Miss Morrow. She began
to discuss tne preparation and painting of rawhide with Plains. Iridian
women during the 1930S when she was a supervisor of Indian arts and
crafts for the Education Division of tne Bureau of Indian Affairs. She
continued her studies among older Indian women of many tribes and on
numerous reservations at a time when many of them could recall the
methods tneir mothers and grandmothers used in working rawhide before
buffalo were exterminated.
The greater part of this book is descriptive of Indian women's methods
of preparing buffalo rawhide for many uses, but most especially for making
rawhide containers.. Detailed accounts of the colors and equipment employed in painting on rawnide are included.
Students of art will especially appreciate the reproductions in color of
Miss Morrow's own painstaking copies of painted designs on rawhide
containers. The variety of simple but striking designs piCtured in these
illustrations leaves little doubt of Indian women's concern for packaging
common items attractively.
COllectors and' museum curators will find Miss Morrow's condensed
chart of tribal characteristics in painted rawhide containers (commonly
Known by the French trader's name of "parfleches") very helpful in identifying examples of this work. Telltale. characteristics may be found as
much in the size, proportions, and construction of these cases as in the
designs and colors painted' on them.
Perhaps etlinohistorians should be more skeptical of the author's repeated claims for the great antiquity of painted rawhide containers among
the: Plains; Indians. Some elderly Indians of more than three decades ago
were of the decided opinion that parfleches, which were commonly made
in pairs and transported with one on each side of a horse, were not known
to Indians before they obtained European horses. They also believed that
tough rawhide containers were little used by Indians before they acquired
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sharp metal knives from white traders. Certainly no painted rawhide case
picturedin· this book was collected before 1833, while the very·great majority of the illustrated examples were received' by museums between 1870
and 1920. By that later date the once-common "American folk art" of making and painting, rawhide containers had all but disappeared among most
tribes of Plains Indians.

Smithsonian Institution

JOHN C. EWERS

THE.ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHI0A:L.ENCYC:r:,OPEDIA OF ARTISTS OF THE AMERICAN WEST. By Peggy and Harold Samuels. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and. Co., 1976. Pp. xxvi, 549. Illus., abbreviations. $25.00.
. THE WORKS OF Frederic Remington and Charles Russell are distinctive,
beautiful, and expensive; Most western historians have seen the art of these
men, but have little knowledge' of their lives and ii1Huence, Moreover,
there are hundreds of other western artists who are relatively obscureknown only to art connoisseurs and dealers. In this reasonably complete
treatment, the authors, dealers, and. recognized authorities on Remington,. have tried, to include information about 17°0 obscure and well-known
western artists. The work contains information about where the various
artists lived; their specialty,. honors and memberships, and in which· collections one can find their works. Additionally; the authors have attempted'
to'give bibliographical references to help find where a particular artist's
work has been, evaluated, the highest known price paid for one of his efforts"
his art training, and his experience in the West. Finally, the writers have
sought "to· provide the feel of the artist as a person, generally from sparse
and second-hand data, and to gauge his importance" (p. vii).
The artists were selected for inclusion in this volume on the basis of
their work, not their geographical location. The book contains frontier
artists from "the early Eastern seaboard to the Pacific shores, an Indian
any place, -California at one time, a landscape that could have been the
backdrop for an Indian or a cowboy" (p. ix). Illustrators are included, but
"copyists, and primitive artists" are not. Those artists in the volume are
divided into ~xplorer artists, railway survey artists, correspondents on horseback after the Civil War, panoramic landscapists,pioneer artists, myth
makers, Taos sophisticates, cowboy artists, and modernists. The 300 half",
tone illustrations in the' work are from both, the more familiar and less
well-known artists. Some of the examples chosen are famous, and others
previously have not been published.
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The authors have succeeded admirably in fulfilling their objectives. This
is nota picture book in any way-although color pictures would have enhanced the aesthetic value. As a reference source it is an excellent addition
to any library.

Oklahoma State University

JAMES A. STOUT, JR.

CONTEMPORARY MEXICO. Edited by James W. Wilkie, Michael C. Meyer
and Edna Monzon de Wilkie. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1976.
Pp. xv, 858. Map, notes, index. Cloth $27.5°, paperback $12.00.
THIS LARGE VOLUME contains .revised and often expanded versions of
papers presented at the Fourth International Congress of Mexican History
(Santa Monica, California, October 1973). Forty-five papers are included,
of which forty deal with some topic in twentieth century Mexican history.
The other five form a small section on the background to modem history,
and are mainly concerned with the colonial period; though two of them
do run on into the nineteenth century.
The book is divided into twelve sections: 1. Background. 2. Population,
Space and Migration. 3. Elites and Masses. 4. Land Reform. 5. The
Church and the Military. 6. Politics. 7. The Politico-economic Position
of Mexico in Latin America. 8. Mexico and the United States. 9. The
Chicano and the Mexican. 10. Education and Cultural Life. 11. Periodization [of politics]. 12. Studying Mexico [i.e. historiography of modem
Mexico].
Sections 8 and 9 may be of particular interest to readers of the Review,
since they treat a number of topics of central concern to the Southwest.
The papers here range from the straightest of historical narrative to the
most speculative of inqUiries. As example of the former is Lyle C. Brown's
account of politically contentious issues between Mexico and the USA
in the 1970S (boundary disputes, drug traffic, immigration, spread of animal
disease and so on). An example of highly speculative research is Amado
M. Padilla's "A Set of Categories for Combining Psychology and History
in the Study ofCulture," which, despite what may seem to many historians
a highly artificial schema for defining culture blending, nevertheless presents many suggestive ideas on the cultural psychology of the Chicano;
and its historical roots. Perhaps the best paper in these sections is "El
Movimiento Chicano y su Relevancia para los Mexicanos," by the Mexican Jorge A. Bustamante, which, after usefully defining the Chicano move-
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ment through its cultural and political aims, goes on to show how Mexico
herself might profit from studying the Chicano phenomenon. Bustamante
suggests that Chicanos.are right in believing that they can attain no position
of true political power without first defining themselves culturally; and
that Mexico must try to identify herself in the same way in order to resist
foreign (particularly US) domination in culture, economics and politics.
Some of Bustamante's. thinking is echoed by Luis Davila, who,in "Otherness in Chicano Literature," argues that the task of Chicano literature is
precisely to layout the cultural identity of the Chicano, and not to serve
as a vehicle for political propaganda. Other useful papers in Sections 8 and
9 deal with the place of Mexican-Americans in general US-Mexican relati~ns from the mid-nineteenth century to 1920; Mexican-American folk
tradition in Southern California; and violence in the Chicano-Anglo relationship in the USA.
The general quality of the papers in this volume, presented by European,
Mexican, Mexican-American and US authors, recommends it to the at. tention of anyone concerned with recent Mexican history.
University of New Mexico

P.

J.

BAKEWELL

FROM GLORY TO OBLIVION: THE REAL TRUTH ABOUT THE MEXICAN
. REVOLUTION. By Guy' Weddington McCreary. New York; Vantage
Press, Inc" 1974. Pp. x, 262, Illus., maps, notes, bibliog:, index. $6.95.
IN THE· preface to his book, Guy Weddington McCreary writes that
nearly everything published on Jose Marfa Maytorena, former governor
of Sonora, revolutionary leader, and the subject of From Glory to Oblivion,
is the offspring of either his political enemies or their followers. All have
attempted to blacken Maytorena's reputation. To balance the picture, McCreary explains, he deliberately refused to rely on anti-Maytorena sources.
But here, in a capsule, lies the weakness of McCreary's book, because,
while relying heavily on original materials, (the private papers of Maytorena, which the family made available to him) McCreary, a businessman
with a shaky mastery of Spanish turned amateur historian, ends up writing
a eulogy of Maytorena that distorts history. No one· will quarrel with McCreary's attempts to right the balance, but only if the nnal result deals
justly with Maytorena's rivals. .Yet, as the current book stands,its author
is simply:another court historian.
Still, there is some value in the study. With his access to the Maytorena
papers, McCreary uses materials previously ignored or unknown. AlsO, as
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the author rightly claims, most existing studies of the conflict in Sonora
during the Mexican Revolution that erupted in 1910 favor Alvaro Obreg6n
and his allies, the ultimate victors. Maytorena's' side of the quarrel'is given
short shl'ift. However, the documents cited by McCreary reveal a much
more complicated picture; in the future, historians of the Revolution, in
Sonora and Mexico as a whole, can ignore the Maytorena papers only at
their own peril. The evidence strongly indicates that political ambitions
and not major political differences, and certainly not ideology, separated
Maytorena from Obreg6n, Venustiano Carranza, and other Constitutionalists. If nothing else, From Glory to Oblivion makes that clear.

University of California, San Diego

RAM6N EDUARDO RUIZ

WILLIAM MULHOLLAND: A FORGOTTEN FOREFATHER. By Robert William
Matson. California: University of the Pacinc, 1976. Pp. vi, 89. lIlus.,
notes, bibliog., index. $7.00.
THIS MODEST VOLUME, a MA thesis from California State University, San
Diego, is a competent and serious treatment of William Mulholland whose
development of the Los Angeles-Owens Valley water program was as responsible as any other single factor for the transformation of the small city
of 1900 into the modern-day metropolis. A major problem to this biographer
was the lack of a collection of Mulholland's personal papers. Their absence
and the lack of insight into the mind and thought of the subject which
they usually provide, has been more than offset by the skillful use of a
diverse collection of materials on the life and times of Mulholland. The
footnotes and bibliography attest to the diligence and thoroughness of Mr.
Matson;
The' basic facts of Mulholland's career are here. A sometime merchant
seaman who came to Southern California and to employment as a ditchtender in 1878, MulhoII:md worked long and hard on his job as well as
during his leisure hours and eventually became an experienced and selftaught "water-engineer" and chief of the Water Department of Los Angeles.
Along the way he became knowledgeable of the importance of water to
this city in a semi-arid region and became adept at designing and improvising means to augment what nature provided. And when the city entered
its twentieth century period of great growth, Mulholland played a major
role' in insuring that growth would not be impeded by lack of water. In
the process the city reached out some 250 miles to the Owens Valley and
despite formidable barriers of desert, mountains, and the opposition of
much of the Valley's population, Mulholland obtained that indispensable
supply of water which insured greatness for Los Angeles.
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Of course this great boon to the city of Los Angeles was a dreadful bane
to the Owens Valley which largely reverted to desert. And while it brought
undeniable benefits to those interested in the growth of the city, it brought
over"sized benefits to some landowners in the area, who were blessed with
an ample supply -of Sierra Nevada water thanks to Mulholland.
The.author touches on diverse aspects of Mulholland's career and deals
candidly with things which do not fit neatly into the generally laudatory
portrait of Mulholland. The San Francisquito Dam ·failure is a case in
point. The chief flaw of the book remains its brevity. It is obvious that Mr.
Matson could have produced a more complete treatment of Mulholland
and the social, political, economic, and technical melieu in which this
builder of dams, aquaducts and siphons of a lavish scale moved. The present
volume is a good beginning.

California State University, Long Beach

DAVID A. WILLIAMS

DISSERTA':f.I0NS ON IBERIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY. By Carl A.
Hanson. New York: The. Whitston Publishing Company, 1975. Pp. v,
400. Notes, index. $20.00.
'CARL HANSON'S COMPILATION 6f Ibero-American dissertations, beyond
the· usual scope of the NMHR, is being reviewed here because its author
carried out most of the research while a graduate student at this university.
Were..this not sufficient reason, other attributes enhance its interest for
the New Mexican historian: atleast five UNM professors are listed, in
addition to nearly fiftyPh.D.s awarded here. Finally, a generous section is
devoted to Northern New Spain, including New Mexico.
Mr. Hanson has co~posed an extremely useful reference work, characterized by careful research, selection, and organization. While ,primarily
a library book (at $20), it is written by a historian for his colleagues. It is
based on an exhaustive search of many sources for dissertations covering
Iberia, her colonia:! .possessions, and "Latin America, submitted prior to
1970 at U.S. 'Canadian, British, and Irish universities. Less than half of
the 3,564 titles are histories, however: the rest are from other disciplines
but are of interest to the:historian.
The organization of the titles is particularly valuable. Major divisions
are Iberia, Iberia Overseas, and Latin America. A separte .section covers
Latin America-United States relations. The 103 headings are su1Iiciently
specific to allow rapid access, since the average section is a little over three
pages. Dissertations covering two or more subjects are cross-referenced,
and thpse whose topics are not evident from the title are often given a
clarifying note. Mr. Hanson wisely provides "general and miscellaneous"
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sections for those dissertations which do not fit easily into his categories.
Finally, there is an author index at the end of the book.
The research value of this work needs little explication. TheSe dissertations contain an enonnous amount of original knowledge, only a portion
of which has foundjts way into print. Most are available through University Microfilms or inter-library loan. Those of us working in Iberian or
Lation American history owe the author a large thanks for making this
material more accessible.
University of New Mexico

MICHAEL L. CONNIFF

THE B1TI'ER ISSUE: THE RIGHT TO WORK LAw IN ARIZONA. By Michael
S. Wade. Tucson: Arizona Historical Society. Monograph 5, 1976. Pp.
151. Illus., index,notes. $10.00.
THE CONFRONTATION that led to right to work laws began in the late 1930S
when union organizers were using force to bring about greater unionization. An alliance that had been developed in California known as The
Associated Falmer Organization was developed in Arizona to counter force
with force. Its President was one Kemper Marley recently in the Arizona
news as the alleged conspirator in the murder of Don Boles and possibly
other violence in recent years in Arizona.
Labor had enjoyed clout in Arizona after statehood as a force in the
Democratic Party which was the party in Arizona winning huge majorities
in state executive offices and the legislature. George W. P. Hunt, the long
time governor, was a labor champion as was the current governor in the
I 940S, Sidney P. Osborn.
The right to work law was introduced into the legislature in 1945 and
aroused great and immediate emotions and threats of violence. The claim
was made that the law was championed bya Texas group known as the
Christian American Association, a right wing bigotted group both in regards
to religion and race. The supporters denied this and claimed support from
Arizona mine, fann and business groups. Wade Church, the prime antagonist, said· the bill was aimed at giving laborers the right to work at substandard wages and conditions and would destroy union working conditions.
Senator Dan Angius, who introduced one of the bills, said it gave a laborer
the right to join a union or to refuse to join a union and made it equally
improper to dismiss a worker for joining a union or for refusing to join a
union.
Two groups worked for the right to work laws after it was made an initiative measure in 1946. Onewas the Veterans Right to Work Commmittee
with such members as John J. Rhodes, Guy Stillman and Barry Goldwater.
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The other was an informal effort by 1. M. Clausen, fonner executive ,of the
Arizona Farm Bureau and one time head of the Small Miners Association
and the Maricopa County Republican Committee.
Labor fOIDled the Citizens Committee Against the Right to' Starve.
The opposition combination demonstrated a weakness, however, when it
failed to get the Democratic Convention in Arizona to oppose the Right
to Work Law in 1946. Labor had major problems, at the time, because
of the number of postwar strikes, labor unrest and the arrogance of national
labor leaders, such as John L. Lewis, which caused the public to be antago.
nistic toward unionized labor.
Beyond that, labor made incredible mistakes in Arizona in gauging the
public mood in its advertising campaign. They lost votes by demanding
total alliance to the labor cause. Meanwhile the right to workers were
stressing three possible courses of action. Unions could be left alone, they
could be regulated by right to work laws, or unions could be abolished. It
put the right to workers in the middle a~d the unions accepted the trap.
The-right to work amendment was supported by every county in the
general election and won by a margin of 62,875 to 49,557. It was upheld
by the Arizona and U.S. Supreme Courts when challenged. The same
argument was forwarded by Levi Udall of the Arizona Supreme Court
and by Hugo' Black of the U.S. Supreme Court. The amendment was
upheld by the two justices who stated that since it' was legaL to ban employers from dismissing laborers for being union members, employers
could also be legally prohibited from dismissing non-union members for
not being union members: A bill to make the- right to work law effective
was passed by the legislature and challenged by protest referendum in
1948. It was upheld in 13 of 14 counties in Arizona and passed by a margin
of 86,866 to 60,295.
The next effort was in Congress to attempt the repeal of 14-B -of the
Taft-Hartley Act which gave the states the right to pass or reject right
to work laws. The effort against repeal was spearheaded in Congress by
Senator Paul Fannin and succeeded. Ultimately Arizona supported those
who supported right to work laws and defeated in elections thoSe who
agreed with right to work laws.
The book was well written and well documented. The author carefully
maintained his purpose of writing only about the right to work law and
'its passage. He does leave the field wide open fOf further research about
pOlitical developments that brought about the emergence of the Republican Party and the situation where labor has become the whipping boy 'of
'
Arizona politics.
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